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Summary
My dissertation contains four essays on strategy and incentive in contest
and tournament.
The rst chapter studies optimal contest design in environments where
the organizer commits to allocate a given set of heterogeneous prizes and
each contestant wins one and only one prize. Contestantse¤ort e¢ ciencies
are their private information and they are ex ante symmetric. We nd that
under the regularity condition of increasing virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency, a grand
all pay auction where all contestants compete together for all available prizes
maximizes the total expected e¤ort, where higher e¤ort wins higher prize.
Chapter 2 investigates optimal prize rationing rule in all pay auctions with
incomplete information. The contest organizer has a set of xed indivisible
prizes, such as a number of certicates, which he can utilize to incentivize
the agents to exert productive e¤ort. Each agent at most wins one prize.
We study the optimal number of prizes the organizer should grant in order
to induce higher e¤ort from agents. The analysis shows that under the reg-
ularity condition of increasing virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency, marginal contribution
of extra prize decreases and it is never optimal for the organizer to award a
prize beyond the point where marginal revenue turns negative. Moreover, we
found that for a family of Beta distributions, the optimal number of prizes
v
SUMMARY vi
weakly increases with the expansion of contestant pool and the improvement
of contestant quality no matter organizer concerns with expected total e¤ort
or expected highest e¤ort. In addition, compared to expected total e¤ort max-
imization, expected highest e¤ort maximization requires a smaller set of prizes
to be awarded.
Chapter 3 is about R&D contests with imperfect quality signals. A buyer
searches for an innovative product and invites two rms to participate in a
contest. A rms bid has two components: the intrinsic quality of the product
and the price. The two rms can be heterogeneous, in that one bears a higher
marginal cost in producing higher quality. Firms simultaneously commit to
their R&D e¤orts to improve their productsquality and submit their price
o¤ers. The buyer inspects rmssubmissions and awards the contract to the
rm that provides the highest perceived buyer surplus. The buyer is unable
to precisely observe the true quality of a rms product. Instead, she receives
a noisy signal of the actual quality o¤ered by each rm. Due to the noise, she
may award the contract to a rm that submits a less competitive bid. With
a nontrivial noisy term in her quality evaluation, a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists in the game. Our analysis depicts the main properties of the equilib-
rium and characterizes rmsresponses to the noise in the quality-evaluation
process. We show that the noise exercises substantial impact on rmsbehav-
ior in structuring their bids, i.e., the trade-o¤ between high quality and low
price. We compare the ex ante expected surplus in this game to that of a
benchmark model in which quality can be perfectly observed. We nd that a
SUMMARY vii
nonexpert buyer can, paradoxically, obtain higher expected surplus in spite of
possible errors it may commit ex post.
Chapter 4 focuses on the behavioral strategy of contest intermediaries.
Leveraging the wisdom of crowds in the form of a contest is not rare among
modern entrepreneurs. The rise in popularity of contest intermediaries based
on easy access to a large pool of the talented around the world and greatly
reduced risk for entrepreneurs. We examined the behavioral strategy of a
monopoly intermediary who is a prot maximizer. We found that given an
entrepreneurs xed crowdsourcing budget, the intermediary will invariantly
favor a xed pricing scheme, whether entrepreneur sets her quality standard
exogenously or endogenously.
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CHAPTER 1
The E¤ort-Maximizing Contest with Heterogeneous
Prizes
1.1. Introduction
A contest is a situation where economic agents expend costly and non-
refundable resources to compete for prizes. Many competitive activities can
be viewed as contests, such as the competition for career promotions within
rms, school admissions, sports, political elections, and R&D races, etc.
As an e¤ective mechanism that provides incentive for productive e¤ort,
contest has generated great interest among academic researchers. A growing
literature has been developed to explore the optimal design of contest in various
contexts. In particular, much research has been conducted on the design of
contests that seek to maximize the contestantstotal expected e¤ort.1
There are many real life situations in which multiple prizes are allocated
during a contest setting. For example, a college admits a pool of new students
for each intake; a regulatory authority may issue more than one licence for
some industry; a rm usually rewards a number of top performing employees;
and a company might have plural vacancies to be lled. For all these examples,
1Among others, Gradstein and Konrad (1999) have emphasized, . . . contest structures are
the outcome of careful design processes, implemented with the view of attaining a variety
of objectives, one of which is the maximization of the e¤ort expended by the contenders.
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a given set of (potentially) heterogeneous prizes is certainly to be distributed
and each contestant wins at most one prize.2 In this paper, we study such
an environment and characterize optimal contest rule that induces maximum
total expected e¤ort while allowing contestantse¤ort e¢ ciencies to be their
private information.
We adopt a two-step approach to establish the optimal contest. In a rst
step, a mechanism design approach of Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Ri-
ley (1989) is adopted with necessary adaptation to the features of our design
problem to establish an upper bound for the total expected e¤ort inducible
when e¤ort is contractable.3 Specically, as we have multiple prizes that are
certainly to be distributed and each contestant wins one and only one prize, an
arbitrary prize allocation outcome in our setting has to be specied appropri-
ately by a one-to-one matching between prizes and contestants.4 We nd that
under a regularity condition of increasing virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency, the optimal
mechanism with contractable e¤ort must allocate the prizes according to con-
testantsvirtual e¤ort e¢ ciencies. With ex ante symmetric players, the most
e¢ cient contestant (with the least marginal e¤ort cost) must be allocated the
highest prize, and the second most e¢ cient contestant must be allocated the
second highest prize, so on and so forth.
2Since zero prizes are allowed in our analysis, there is no loss of generality to assume there
is a one-to-one matching between players and prizes for any prize allocation outcome.
3Contractable e¤ort requires that the exact level of e¤ort is observable and veriable, which
is not a standard assumption for moral hazard problem. We will relax this assumption when
we study the implementation of the optimal mechanism.
4There is no loss of generality to consider the case where the numbers of prizes and con-
testants are the same as zero prize can be viewed as a prize.
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In a second step, with ex ante symmetric players, we show that the estab-
lished upper bound can be reached by a grand contest of all pay auction, which
only requires rank information of e¤ort: Every player makes an e¤ort, which
he will pay eventually no matter which prize he wins. The prizes are allocated
according to the ranks of the e¤ort. The highest e¤ort wins the highest prize,
the second highest e¤ort wins the second highest prize, so on and so forth.
Our ndings can be illustrated intuitively. The virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency can
be interpreted as the amount of expected e¤ort inducible from a contestant
by one unit (e.g. per dollar) of prize. Therefore, maximization of expected
total e¤ort would require higher prizes to be matched with higher virtual ef-
fort e¢ ciencies to induce higher total e¤ort from contestants. When virtual
e¤ort e¢ ciency increases with genuine e¤ort e¢ ciency, for every realization
of playersrandom genuine e¤ort e¢ ciency prole, the ranks of virtual e¤ort
e¢ ciencies of contestants coincide with those of their genuine e¤ort e¢ cien-
cies. Therefore, optimal mechanism must match higher prize to higher genuine
e¤ort e¢ ciency. With ex ante symmetric players, Moldovanu and Sela (2006)
established the unique symmetric (increasing) pure strategy bidding equilib-
rium for an all pay auction with heterogeneous prizes. It is thus clear that an
all pay auction must implement the optimal prize allocation rule. Therefore
the maximum total expected e¤ort is achieved by an all pay auction under the
regularity condition of increasing virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency.
3
Our paper is closely related to Polishchuk and Tonis (2013) who endogenize
the optimal contest success functions in a setting of incomplete information fol-
lowing a mechanism design approach. Our study di¤erentiates from their work
by considering the optimal allocation of a xed set of multiple heterogeneous
prizes. Our paper is also related to Moldovanu and Sela (2001) who establish
the optimality of winner-take-all principle in all pay auction framework where
e¤ort e¢ ciencies are bidders private information. Our paper di¤erentiates
from their work by two aspects. First, we allow more contest mechanisms
while adopting a mechanism design approach. Second, the prizes are xed in
our analysis while they are choice variables in Moldovanu and Sela (2001).
Our work is also closely connected to the literature on division of a contest
with a xed set of prizes. Relying on the results of Maskin and Riley (1989) on
optimal multi-unit auction where each bidder has a single unit demand,5 Ando
(2004) demonstrate that in an all pay auction setting with homogenous prizes
and private e¤ort e¢ ciency, a grand contest dominates any equally divided
contest consisting of identical subcontests in terms of expected total e¤ort.
The dominance result of Ando (2004) requires a regular condition of increasing
virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency.6 Fu and Lu (2009) investigate whether an arbitrary
5In their work, the allocation rule is assigned as the form of bidders winning probability
for each unit object. However, in our study, the allocation rule is written in the form of
allocation outcome of multiple hetergoneous prizes which will simplify the whole proving
process.
6Moldovanu and Sela (2006) reveal the dominance of an all pay auction with a single grand
prize, if in divided contests the grand prize splits into identical single prizes for identical
subcontests. Specically, they nd that as long as the cost function is linear or concave,
the dominance of the grand contest always holds regardless of the distributions of e¤ort
e¢ ciency. One should note that in Moldovanu and Sela (2006) the prizes di¤er across the
grand and divided contests, which di¤erentiates their study from Ando (2004).
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division of a grand contest can induce higher total e¤ort in a nested Tullock
contest framework with a given set of heterogeneous prizes. In the analysis of
Fu and Lu (2009), contestantse¤ort e¢ ciency instead is public information.
They nd that as long as the impact function is log concave, a grand contest
generates more e¤ort than any set of subcontests. The optimality of a grand all
pay auction established in our paper immediately implies that given an all pay
auction institution, the dominance of a grand contest extends under plausible
regularity condition to an environment of incomplete information where prizes
are heterogeneous, and the contestants and prizes are arbitrarily split.
1.2. The Analysis
1.2.1. The Setup
We adopt the setup of Moldovanu and Sela (2006) while assuming a linear
e¤ort cost function. There are N ( 3) risk neutral contestants who compete
for N non-negative prizes v1  v2  :::  vN  0 by exerting their e¤ort
simultaneously. The values of prizes are public information, and zero prizes
are accommodated as the special cases. Every contestant wins one and only
one prize.
We denote player is e¤ort by ei, i 2 f1; 2; ::; Ng. Exerting an e¤ort ei will
cost him ei
i
, where i is player is e¤ort e¢ ciency that is his private information.
And the e¤ort e¢ ciency prole is an n-tuple  = (i)N1. Players are ex
ante symmetric. We assume is are independently and identically distributed
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following cumulative distribution function F () on [, ] with density function
f() > 0. We impose the following condition.
Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency: Virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency function
J(i) = i   1 F (i)f(i) increases with i, where i 2 [, ].
1.2.2. Optimal Contest
We now look for the optimal contest rule that induces the highest total ex-
pected e¤ort. We take a two-step approach. In a rst step, we adopt a
mechanism design approach to establish an upper bound of total expected ef-
fort while assuming contractable e¤ort. In a second step, we show this upper
bound can be reached by an all pay auction, whose implementation requires
only rank information of e¤ort.
1.2.2.1. An Upper Bound of Total Expected E¤ort Obtained with
Contractable E¤ort. According to the revelation principle, to establish the
upper bound of total expected e¤ort inducible from any contest mechanism
that is based on contractable e¤ort, we can focus on truthful direct mecha-
nisms. A direct mechanism species the probability for each prize allocation
outcome, and the e¤ort of all contestants as functions of playersmessages
about their types. One should note that the mechanism design approach re-
quires the observability and veriability of the exact level of e¤ort such that
the e¤ort level can be contracted on. We begin with this strong assumption
to derive an upper bound for the total expected e¤ort inducible, and later
6
we will show that we only need the rank information of contestantse¤ort to
implement the maximum total expected e¤ort.
A prize allocation outcome is a one-to-one matching between the con-
testants and prizes. Clearly, there are altogether N ! allocation outcomes.
Let vector Vj = (vj1; vj2; :::; vjN) denotes the jth allocation outcome where
vji 2 fv1; v2;:::; vNg is the prize allocated to player i, and we must have vji and
vjk (8i 6= k) are di¤erent elements in the prize set. In a direct mechanism, the
probability for prize allocation outcome Vj is denoted by pj(
0); j = 1; 2; :::; N !,
where 0i denotes the player is reported type and 
0 = (0i)N1. Contestant
is e¤ort is denoted by ei(





0) = 1; pj(
0)  0;8j;80.
As a special feature of contest design problem, the minimum payo¤ of each
contestant is vN . This reects the fact that any contestant can guarantee him
a payo¤ of at least vN by exerting zero e¤ort.

















where  i = (1; 2; :::; i 1; i+1; :::; N).
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For convenience, we dene eui(0i; i) = iui(0i; i), i.e.,





The individual rationality condition (i.e., ui(i; i)  vN) is written as





Incentive compatibility condition requires that









(1.5) eui(i; i) = eui(; ) + Z i

Qi(si)dsi:
Similar to Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1989), we have that a
direct mechanism is truthful if and only if: (i)Qi(i) increases with i; (ii) Eqn.
(1.5) holds; and (iii) individual rationality requirement (1.3) holds. Based on
these results, the following useful expression for total expected e¤ort obtains:
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Lemma 1.1. For a truthful direct mechanism, the total expected e¤ort can
be written as



























































































































Before we proceed, we rst present a well-known inequality in order to
establish an upper bound for the total expected e¤ort inducible.
Lemma 1.2. (Rearrangement Inequality) Given any two sequences X =







aibi , where a(i) and b(i) are respectively the ith highest
element in the two sequences.
Let (k) () denote the kth highest type among all is, 8 =(1; 2; :::; N).
Let V ();8 denote the prize allocation outcome that the kth highest prize is
allocated to the contestant with e¤ort e¢ ciency (k) , 8k. Dene the following
prize allocation rule p:
(1.7) pj() =
8><>: 1 if Vj = V
();
0 if Vj 6= V ():
Lemma 1.3. Under the Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency condi-
tion, any contest cannot induce a total expected e¤ort more than
(1.8) TE = E
NX
k=1
[J((k))  vk] NvN :
Proof. Clearly, any prize allocation rule p that di¤ers from p would lead to
positive probabilities for some prize allocation outcomes other than V (), 8.
The individual rationality condition (1.3) implies that
NX
i=1
eui(; )  NvN .
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J(i)vji] for each . We thus have
TE  TE. 
1.2.2.2. Implementation of Optimal Contest by Rank Information of
E¤ort. We next show that the upper bound established above can be reached
by an all pay auction, whose implementation only requires rank information
of e¤ort.
Lemma 1.4. For a grand all pay auction where all contestants compete for
all available prizes, prize allocation rule p of (1.7) is implemented ; Moreover,
the payo¤ of the least e¢ cient type is ui(; ) = vN .
Proof. Dene k = vk   vN ; k = 1; 2; :::; N . Thus we have N = 0 and
k  0; k < N . Note that sequence k decreases with k and the number
of positive elements is smaller than N . Suppose the e¤ort function b(i) is
strictly monotonic and di¤erentiable. Player is maximization problem is to












N k(b 1(x))[1  F (b 1(x))]k 1 + vN(1 
N 1X
k=1





(vk   vN)FN k(b 1(x))[1  F (b 1(x))]k 1 + vN   x
i
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Clearly, the equilibrium strategy of an all pay auction remains the same if
the prizes are {k} instead of {vk}. Proposition 1 of Moldovanu and Sela
(2006) applies to an all pay auction with prizes {k}. We thus obtain that
the equilibrium e¤ort strategy is increasing, and the payo¤of the least e¢ cient
type is zero. These results mean that for an all pay auction with prizes {vk},
prize allocation rule p of (1.7) is implemented as the kth highest prize is
allocated to the contestant with e¤ort e¢ ciency (k) , 8k and  =(1; 2; :::; N),
and the equilibrium payo¤ of the least e¢ cient type is vN . 
Proposition 1.1. Under the Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency
condition, a grand all pay auction achieves the upper bound of e¤ort TE,
and thus is optimal.
Proof. Lemma 1.4 immediately means that TE is achieved by a grand all
pay auction. It thus follows that an all pay auction is optimal in terms of total
expected e¤ort induced. 
Although observability and veriability of the exact level of e¤ort is re-
quired in the optimal mechanism design approach, the upper bound of ex-
pected total e¤ort TE achieved by grand all pay auction only needs relative
ranking information of contestantse¤ort. Thus, grand all pay auction is the
optimal contest rule that induces the highest total expected e¤ort even when
only rank information is available to the organizer. Moreover, among the
family of Tullock contest, all pay auction is the unique optimal contest.
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Proposition 1.1 requires symmetric players. The prize allocation rule ac-
cording to virtual e¤ort e¢ ciencies remains to be optimal with ex ante asym-
metric players. However, in general, a standard all pay auction would not
implement the optimal prize allocation rule.
1.2.3. Split Contests
We name the contest Cg(N;v) the grand contest, where the N contestants
compete against all others for the N prizes and v , (v1; v2;:::; vN) with v1 
v2:::  vN . We allow the organizer to have the exibility to split the grand




Nm. In the subcontest Cm, a contestant competes against Nm   1
opponents for the Nm ranked prizes vm , (vm1 ; vm2 ; :::; vmNm) with
vm1  vm2  :::  vmNm, 8m 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg .
Every element of vm must be in v, and every element of v must go to one and
only one vm. WhenM = 1, the split contest degenerates to the grand contest.
Proposition 1.1 immediately implies the following two results.
Corollary 1.1 (Superadditive E¤ort). Suppose the Increasing Virtual
E¤ort E¢ ciency condition holds. Within an institution of all pay auction,
a grand contest induces more expected total e¤ort than any split contest con-
sisting of a set of subcontests.
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Proof. Denote TEm the total expected e¤ort collected by the organizer in
each subcontest Cm, with m 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg. By lemma 1.3 and 1.4, we can

















where m = (
m
i )Nm1 denotes the contestantsn-tuple type prole and 
m
i is
player is e¤ort e¢ ciency in the subcontest Cm. 
(k)
m (m) is the k
th highest
type among all mi s. Then given any realization , by the rearrange inequality,
TEm < TE as vmN  vN ,8m 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg. 
According to (1.6), the dominance of a grand all pay auction can be seen
more intuitively from the following two facts. Firstly, a grand all pay auction
guarantees that a higher prize is always matched with a contestant with higher
virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency such that each prize is allocated in the most e¢ cient
way in terms of inducing expected higher e¤ort. On the other hand, for any
divided contest, this allocation e¢ ciency must be lost for a strictly positive
measure of the realizations of contestantse¤ort e¢ ciencies. Secondly, by the
revenue equivalence theorem, the total e¤ort generated from a contest must
decrease with the payo¤ of the least e¢ cient type of contestant. For an all pay
auction, this payo¤ coincides with the lowest prize of the contest. Clearly, the
lowest prize in the grand contest is always smaller (weakly) than that of any
subcontest.
14
Note that the suboptimality of split contests relies on the ex ante sym-
metry of players, as evidenced by the well established Exclusion Principle for
asymmetric all pay auctions.
Corollary 1.2. Suppose the Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency con-
dition holds. Consider an institution of an all pay auction with multiple prizes.
If the number of contestants and the number of each prize vk are scaled up by
a common integer factor k, the total expected e¤ort increases by more than k
times.
Proof. Note that the scaled up contest can be split into k subcontests, where
each of them is identical to the original contest. 
1.3. Concluding Remarks
It is commonly observed in practice that better prizes are awarded to better
performers in multi-prize multi-winner contests. In this paper, we rationalize
this prize allocation rule from a perspective of e¤ort maximization. We es-
tablish that when contestantse¤ort e¢ ciency distribution is regular and only
rank information of e¤ort is available, then a grand all pay auction maximizes
the total expected e¤ort, where all contestants compete together and higher
e¤ort wins better prizes. This result is very intuitive, since contestantsvirtual
e¤ort e¢ ciencies can be interpreted as the amount of expected e¤ort inducible
from them by one unit of prize. As a result, to maximize expected total e¤ort,
the optimal prize allocation rule must match higher virtual e¤ort e¢ ciencies
15
with better prizes. An immediate implication is that any division of the grand
contest into a set of subcontests would lead to lower expected total e¤ort.
16
CHAPTER 2
Optimal Prize Rationing In all pay auction With
Incomplete Information
2.1. Introduction
Many types of strategic interaction in which economic agents expend costly
and non-refundable resources to pull ahead of their rival to compete for a set of
prizes can be modeled as a contest. As an e¤ective mechanism that provides
incentive for productive e¤ort, contest has generated great interest among
academic researchers.
Most of the large economic literature on contests has focused on the issue of
optimal contest design given the xed prizes budget or prizes set, including the
work Barut and Kovenock (1998), Glazer and Hassin (1988), and Moldovanu
and Sela (2001, 2006). However, there are many real world cases where a
contest organizer is not constrained by prize budget.
For instance, in order to recognize companies for their achievements in
quality and business performance as well as to raise awareness about the im-
portance of quality and performance excellence as a competitive edge, the
Baldrige Awards program was established in 1987 by the U.S. congress. There
is no cash prize, but there is prestige in such program and U.S. congress has
no budget decits problem. While this is primarily a recognition prize, it
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also acts as an inducement for rms to adopt the techniques of total quality
management. According to statistics, median growth in revenue for two-time
Baldrige Award winner is 92.5% and median job growth for two-time Baldrige
Award winner is 65.5% till 2011. Therefore, many companies have upgraded
their quality programs in the hope of being considered for the awards.
The other typical contest without prize budget constraint is Medical/Doctor
certication exams and Bar exams which aim at controlling professional stan-
dard of candidates as well as improving their qualication in the related indus-
try. Despite lacking direct monetary incentives in such certication exam, the
improved future prospects from gaining the certication is the key motivation
for increasing candidates e¤orts.
Even though the funding pressure is not an issue in the Baldrige Awards
program and some Professional Associations, the Baldrige Awards assessment
committee still needs to carefully design the number of awards as to improve
overall organizational performance management system. Moreover, when Pro-
fessional Associations hold qualication exam, it is never advisable to set
passing rate at one hundred percentage if the organizer expects to enhance
the level of expertise in the related industry. This begs the question of how
many Baldrige Awards should Congress award annually given the imperfect
knowledge of institutional quality. And how should Professional Associations
set exam passing rate to incentivize contestants with unknown ability?
Furthermore, even if the organizer has the xed indivisible prizes set, does
distributing all the prizes necessarily benet the organizer? What factors
18
should be taken into consideration in the designing process of the optimal
number of awarded prizes? Despite the importance, these questions have yet
to be fully explored in the optimal contest design literature.
In order to answer the above questions, this paper studies the optimal
prize rationing rule in the all pay auction with incomplete information when
the organizer faces indivisible xed prizes set or unlimited indivisible prizes set
and each contestant wins at most one prize. For tractability, we simply assume
that the demand of whole market is nearly perfectly elastic and awarding more
prizes will not alter the market value of these prizes.
We nd that under the regularity conditions, marginal contribution of ex-
tra prize is always diminishing and organizer should stop at a point where
marginal benet of an additional prize equals to zero. Particularly, when
contestantsability distribution follows the Beta distribution (with one shape
parameter restricted to 1), if the organizer intends to maximize expected total
e¤ort or highest e¤ort, the optimal number of awarded prizes is non-decreasing
with the amount of contestants. Moreover, if the overall quality of contestants
pool is enhanced, more prizes will be expected. Nevertheless, compared with
the situation where organizer aims to maximize expected total e¤ort, extra
prize is seldom needed to maximize expected highest e¤ort. Intuitively, when
marginal prize induces positive e¤ort for both "high-ability" and "low-ability"
contestants, such prize will always be sensibly added to the awarded prize
set. However, when the marginal prize contribution has opposite e¤ect for
"high-ability" and "low-ability" contestants, that is to say, additional prize
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can motivate "low-ability" contestants and deject "high-ability" contestants
to some points owning to a less competitive battleeld than ever, and if orga-
nizer wants to maximize average e¤ort, the optimal prize rationing rule will
crucially depend on the distribution of contestantsabilities. For instance, if
more people distribute around "middle- and low-ability", then organizer would
prefer keep such marginal prize. However, if and when the organizer intends to
maximize expected highest e¤ort, further trimming down prize pool would be
happened as organizer care more about "high-ability" contestantsincentives.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 presents the contest model with multiple prizes un-
der incomplete information. Section 2.4 the optimal prize rationing rule is
analyzed explicitly. After that, we will make a conclusion in Section 2.5.
2.2. Literature Review
Our work is consistent with two literature strands. First, it highly re-
lated to multiple prizes contest literature. Lazear and Rosen (1981) study
the optimal structure in a two person contest with two prizes and compare
it to optimal piece rate. Based on Lazear and Rosens (1981) ranked order
tournament model, Krishna and Morgan(1998) analyze the optimal allocation
rule among few nonnegative prizes with two, three, or four contestants. Barut
and Kovenock (1998), and Glazer and Hassin (1988) focus on multi-prize all
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pay auction with heterogeneous prizes under the institution of complete in-
formation. In contrast, Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) examine an incom-
plete information contest and establish the unique symmetric (increasing) pure
strategy bidding equilibrium for an all pay auction with heterogeneous prizes.
Among theses studies, the underline assumption is that the prize budget is
xed and it will be split into multiple prizes except for Lazear and Rosens
(1981) work.
Our work is also closely connected to the literature on division of a contest
with a xed set of prizes. Relying on the results of Maskin and Riley (1989)
on optimal multi-unit auction where each bidder has a single unit demand,
Ando (2004) demonstrated that in an all pay auction setting with homogenous
prizes and private e¤ort e¢ ciency, a grand contest dominates any equally di-
vided contest consisting of identical subcontests in terms of total e¤ort. The
dominance result of Ando (2004) requires a regular condition of increasing
virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency. Fu and Lu (2009) investigate whether an arbitrary
division of a grand contest can induce higher total e¤ort in a nested Tullock
contest framework with a given set of heterogeneous prizes. Although we study
the contest with a xed set of prizes, now we can analyze how am organizer
can improve revenue further when she has the exibility to ration prizes set.
2.3. Model Setup
We adopt the setup of Moldovanu and Sela (2006) while assuming a linear
e¤ort cost function. There are N risk neutral contestants who compete for S
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(S < N) non-negative homogeneous prizes v , such as Baldrige Award and
Professional Qualication Certicate, by exerting their e¤ort simultaneously.
The values of prizes are public information. Contestant wins one and only one
prize. Although we focus on homogeneous prizes, the analysis of heterogeneous
prizes is exactly the same.
We denote player is e¤ort by ei. Exerting an e¤ort ei will cost him eii ,
where i is player is e¤ort e¢ ciency that is his private information. We
assume is are independently and identically distributed following cumulative
distribution function F () on  ,   with density function f() > 0. We
impose the following condition.
Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency: Virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency function
J(i) = i   1 F (i)f(i) increases with i, where i 2 [, ].
2.3.1. Bidding Strategies
Employing the methodology of Moldovanu and Sela (2006) leads to the fol-
lowing equilibrium bidding strategy in an all pay auction.
Lemma 2.1. (Moldovanu and Sela 2006) In an all pay auction with N
contestants and S homogeneous prizes denoted by v, the unique increasing










(2.2) FNs (t) =
(N   1)!
(s  1)!(N   s)!(1  F (t))
s 1F (t)N s
is a representative contestants probability of ranking s among N contestants.
Then the expected total e¤ort R is






[1  F ()] dFNs ().
Proof. See Appendix. 
2.3.2. Expected total revenue in the form of virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency
For the convenience, denote (s;N) as the random variable corresponding to
the sth order statistic out of N independent variables (that is, (1;N) is the
highest-order statistics, etc.) and F(s;N) is the respective distribution. The
density of (s;N) is as follows
(2.4) dF(s;N)() = C1Nf()F
N
s ()dF ()
Now, we want to make a connection between expected total e¤ort and
virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency in order to explore some properties more fundamentally.
Utilizing Myersons(1981) mechanism approach, we can rewrite the expected
total e¤ort in terms of expected virtual e¤ort e¢ ciency with the order statistics
of e¤ort e¢ ciency as a variable, and the following result is obtained.
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Lemma 2.2. The total expected e¤ort R can also be expressed in terms of
virtual e¤ort e¢ ciencies as follows




Proof. See Appendix. 
2.4. Prize Rationing
2.4.1. Prize Rationing: Maximize Expected Total E¤ort
When the prizes are rewarded in the form of recognition instead of material
awards, contest organizer does not have to bear nancial pressure. However,
the optimal number of prizes still needs to be carefully designed as more prizes
may not necessarily contribute more e¤orts. Intuitively, if organizer awards
all the contestants, she will expect nothing from all the contestants in the
homogeneous prizes context. In addition, even if organizer has decided on a
given set of multiple prizes, rationing prizes might even increase the expected
total e¤ort further compared with the case of distributing all of them. The
following example will illustrate it in detail.
2.4.1.1. Example. Applying the result of Lemma 2.1, we rst investigate
the impact of an additional prize on equilibrium bidding strategy through an
example. Consider an all pay auction with N = 6 contestants, and the orga-
nizer has all together 4 identical prizes of value 1 which are indivisible. He
can either award all prizes or withhold one of them. The contestantse¤ort
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e¢ ciencies are independently and identically distributed following uniform dis-
tribution on [0; 1]. According to Lemma 2.1, the bidding strategies for the case
of 4 prizes and 3 prizes are respectively illustrated in following graph:
Figure 2.1 Bidding Strategies
Clearly, the more e¢ cient contestants tend to shirk when the number of
prizes increases, while the less e¢ cient contestants are more incentivized. The
net e¤ect of the additional prize on total expected e¤ort is thus not obvious.





as the number of prizes increases from 3 to 4:
This example shows the possibility that contest organizer can indeed im-
prove the performance of the contest by withholding a subset of prizes. Before
we proceed to fully establish the optimal prize rationing rule, some results will
be introduced rst for convenience.
2.4.1.2. Prize Rationing Analysis. At this point, several functional prop-
erties related to adding one more prize will be examined. From lemma 2.1, we
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will see that marginal contribution of extra prize will always decrease in terms
of expected total e¤orts.
Lemma 2.3. Under Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency condition,R 

[1  F ()] dFNs () strictly decreases with s.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Although it is never desirable to award all the contestants, we can show




[1  F ()] dFNN () < 0; ii)
R 

[1  F ()] dFN1 () > 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Now we are ready to characterize the optimal prize rationing principle by
using the above results.
Assume that the organizer has S positive homogeneous prizes, where S 2
f1; 2; ::; N   1g, dene s^ = min{maxs{
R 

[1  F ()] dFNs ()  0},S}. By
lemma 2.4, s^ is well dened and 1  s^ < N and we have the following results.
Proposition 2.1. Under Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency con-
dition, the organizer should only award s^ prizes to induce the highest total
expected e¤ort.
Proof. See Appendix. 
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2.4.1.3. Number of contestants. Now we will see how the optimal prize
rationing principle changes with the number of contestants. Intuitively, the
expected highest e¤ort e¢ ciency for N1 contestants should be less than the one
for N2 contestants if N1 < N2. In other words, F(1;N2)() rst order stochastic
dominates F(1;N1)(). However, whether such property can be extended to
expected sth highest e¤ort e¢ ciency (1 < s < N) is not obvious. But the
following lemma does tell that s^ will be non-decreasing with the number of
contestants.
Lemma 2.5. Under Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency condition,
the number of optimal awarded prizes is non decreasing with the number of
contestants.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 2.5 implies that when the pool of contestants is enlarged, the con-
tribution of marginal winner is still nonnegative and cutting prizes can never
optimize contestantsexpected total e¤orts in this scenario.
2.4.1.4. Shape of distribution. To enrich our analysis, a family of Beta dis-
tribution F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1] will be investigated in detail, which
covers concave, linear and convex distribution. When we study such family dis-
tribution, Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency condition can be relaxed as
the contribution of extra prize satises single crossing property, which means
if s  s0,
R 

[1  F ()] dFNs ()  0 and if s  s0,
R 

[1  F ()] dFNs ()  0.
Lemma 2.6 will provide the proof for the above claim.
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Lemma 2.6. Assume F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1], then1
Z 











f1  (1 + k)s
1 + kN
g
and there exists only one point s0 s.t.,
R 

[1  F ()] dFNs0 () = 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
According to lemma 2.6, we can simplify the expected total e¤ort expres-
sion further.












f1  (1 + k)s
1 + kN
g
Proof. From lemma 2.1 and lemma 2.6, the above result can be obtained
directly. 
In addition, we can observe that the optimal number of prizes s^ is a function
of N and k, which is denoted as s^(N; k). We have already proved that in
general case, s^ is non-decreasing with N . The next interesting question is
how prize rationing principle changes with the shape of distribution, in other
words, how the optimal number of prizes varies with k. Intuitively, when
k increases, the quality of contestants will be improved and the competition
tends to be intensied. Adding one more prize, on the one hand can mitigate
1The properties of  (:) will be reviewed in the appendix.
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erce competition and encourage more contestants. On the other hand, it
might demotivate contestants as more prizes are now available.
Despite these two e¤ects, lemma 2.8 shows that organizer will never reduce
prizes when k increases as the former e¤ect is more salient.
Lemma 2.8. Suppose F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1], then bs(k;N) is
non-decreasing with k:
Proof. See Appendix. 
2.4.1.5. Scaled up e¤ects. In practice, one interesting question the orga-
nizer often has to grapple with is how the optimal quantity of awarded prizes
vary when the number of contestants scaled up by a common integer factor
n. In particular, how should Baldrige Awards committee select winners as the
number of applications increases n times? How should rm design promotion
positions when the number of employees is expanded by n times? How should
education council set exam passing rate if the number of candidates is raised
by n times? Should the desired number of prizes simply increases n times as
well or less (greater) than n times?
In order to answer these questions, Lemma 2.9 demonstrates that the mag-
nitude of increment in optimal number of prizes will depend on contestants
ability distribution as well as the growth rate of contestant pool.
Lemma 2.9. Suppose F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1], if the number of
contestants increases n times, the optimal number of prizes bs2 will depend on
bs1, where bs1 is the initial desired number of prizes:
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Case 1 : if
bs1 > kNn+ 1
n+ kn
bs2 < nbs1.
Case 2 : if
kNn  k
n+ kn
 bs1  kNn+ 1
n+ kn
bs2 = nbs1.
Case 3 : if
bs1 < kNn  k
n+ kn
bs2 > nbs1.
Proof. See Appendix. 
As bs1 2 (kN k1+k ; kN+11+k ], from lemma 2.9, the closer (further) bs1 gets to kN k1+k ,
the more (less) likely bs2 increases n times when the number of contestants
enlarges n times. Following is one numerical example.
Example 2.1. Case I: if N = 5, k = 0:4, bs1 = 2. When N increases to
10, bs2 = 3 < 2bs1.
Case II: if N = 3, k = 2, bs1 = 2. When N increases to 6, bs2 = 4 = 2bs1.
Case III: if N = 2, k = 2, bs1 = 1. When N increases to 6, bs2 = 4 > 3bs1.
Clearly, from lemma 2.6, even if bs can be the real number, bs doesnt increase
proportionally to the expansion of contestant pool. Furthermore, as bs must
be rounded, bs will not change monotonic with N .
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2.4.2. Prize Rationing: Maximize Expected Highest E¤ort
It is generally known that the aim of contest organizer may not be conned to
maximize expected total e¤ort. Take R&D races as an example, usually the
organizer would like to maximize expected highest e¤ort to improve current
technology. Therefore, in this section, we will make the parallel analysis to
gure out the optimal prize rationing rule if the expected highest e¤ort is
maximized. Before formally characterizing optimal prize rationing rule, some
properties will be introduced rst.




Lemma 2.10. The expected highest e¤ort EH can be induced in all pay












Proof. See Appendix. 
Once the expected highest e¤ort is written in terms of modied virtual
e¤ort e¢ ciency, then the twin result will be attained: marginal contribution
of extra prize on the expected highest e¤ort decreases under condition 2.
Lemma 2.11. Under condition 2,
R 

(1  FN())dFNs () is a decreasing
function with s:
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Proof. See Appendix. 
Intuitively, the marginal contribution of rst prize on the expected highest





1  FN() dFNN () < 0; ii) R  1  FN() dFN1 () >
0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Now the optimal prize rationing rule in this case can be examined following
which corresponds to the results when organizer maximizes expected total
e¤ort.




1  FN() dFNs ()  0},S}. By lemma 2.12,
s^h is well dened and 1  s^h < N .
Proposition 2.2. Under Condition 2, the organizer should withhold the
lowest N   s^h prizes if they are positive, and award the s^h highest prizes to
induce the highest expected e¤ort.
Proof. Same proof as Proposition 2.1. 
Similarly, adopting the parallel methodology, we will focus on a family of
Beta distribution to study how optimal prize rationing principle varies with
di¤erent factors when expected highest e¤ort is maximized. Meanwhile, by
analyzing such distribution, condition 2 can also be relaxed as single crossing
property is still satised.
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1  FN() dFNs0 () = 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Therefore, the expected highest e¤ort can be obtained from lemma 2.13 as
follows.
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Proof. From Lemma 2.10 and 2.13, we can get the result directly. 
2.4.2.1. Numbers of contestants. Once the number of contestants in-
creases, intensied competition will demand more e¤ort from contestants, but
at the same time can harm the contestantscondence of winning the game.
Therefore, the organizer faces the challenge of balancing these two e¤ects.
Lemma 2.15 shows that when the pool of contestants is enlarged, the set of
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awarded prizes should not be shrunk, otherwise, contestants incentives will
be hurt.
Lemma 2.15. Suppose F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1], then the number
of awarded prizes will be non-decreasing with the number of contestants.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Despite extra prize toning down the competition, it may raise the con-
dence of contestants when they face more opponents.
2.4.2.2. Shape of distribution. From lemma 2.14, it is unambiguous that
bsh will be altered with N and k, hence bsh is a function of N and k, which
is denoted as bsh(N; k). When candidatesquality are strengthened, by the
same token, intensied competition demands more incentives to induce higher
e¤ort from contestants. And lemma 2.17 veries that organizer can never
trim the number of prizes when k increases. Before we formally prove it, one
mathematical result is needed.
Lemma 2.16. Assume m(x) = (x+N)
sQ
i=1




2N   i), then m0(x) < n0(x).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Utilizing lemma 2.16, the non-decreasing property of optimal prize ra-
tioning rule with the variation of k can be demonstrated.
Lemma 2.17. Suppose F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1], then bsh(k;N)
is non-decreasing with k:
34
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 2.17 shows that it is never sensible to cut prize when candidates
competency are improved. Furthermore, it implies that when k increases to
certain extent, extra prize will be desired to stimulate the expected highest
e¤ort.
2.4.2.3. Scaled up e¤ects. Moreover, we are still interested in the mag-
nitude of increasement of prize set when the number of contestants expands
n times. However, due to technical complexities, the explicit solution with
regards to scaled up e¤ects could not be obtained. But numerically, we can
show the growth of prize set can be either way when the candidates pool is
enlarged n times. The numerical example is as follows.
Example 2.2. Case I : if N = 3, k = 2, bs1 = 2. When N increases to 6,
bs2 = 2 < 2bs1.
Case II :if N = 5, k = 0:4, bs1 = 1. When N increases to 10, bs2 = 2 = 2bs1.
Case III :if N = 2; k = 10, bs1 = 1. When N increases to 4, bs2 = 3 > 2bs1.
Hence, when the number of contestants increases n times, whether the
number of awarded prizes grows more or less than n times crucially depends
on the initial optimal condition assuming the organizer wants to maximize
expected highest e¤ort.
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2.4.3. Comparison: Expected Highest E¤ort and Expected Total
E¤ort
We have already analyzed the optimal prize rationing rule when organizer
possesses di¤erent objectives. Yet, how the optimal prize rationing rule varies
with di¤erent objectives is still questionable. From example 1, adding one
more prize can incentivize less capable contestant but discourage the more
capable ones. When the organizer intends to maximize expected total e¤ort,
she should care more on the incentives of all the contestants compared with
the case that she only wants to maximize expected highest e¤ort. In this way,
we can infer that the optimal awarded prize set in the second case can never
exceed the rst one. Lemma 2.18 will justify our conjecture.
Lemma 2.18. Suppose F () = k (k > 0) where  2 [0; 1], then s^h  bs.
Proof. See Appendix. 
When the organizer maximizes expected highest e¤ort, the awarded prizes
pool can never be enlarged as organizer will hurt top performing contestants.
Therefore, the optimal awarded prizes set will be varied with the objectives of
organizer.
2.5. Concluding Remarks
Now we can answer the question that we set out in the beginning if the
organizer faces the problem of how to design the number of indivisible prizes
to achieve certain objective when budget set is unlimited, for instance, prizes
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are non-monetary. Moreover, despite the given set of indivisible prizes, in the
multi-prize multi-winner contest, the organizer has to carefully decide optimal
prize rationing rule to induce desirable e¤ort level from contestants instead of
distributing all of them. In this paper, we propose the mechanism on how the
organizer set optimal prize rationing rule for a particular objective. And we
nd that under regularity conditions, marginal contribution of extra prize is
always diminishing and organizer should stop at a point where marginal e¤ect
of additional prize equals to zero. Furthermore, one family of Beta distrib-
ution has been examined in detail to capture the variation of optimal prize
rationing rule with the change of distribution. In general, when the organizer
maximizes expected total e¤ort or highest e¤ort, the optimal number of prizes
is non-decreasing with the number of contestants. Once the overall quality of
contestants is improved, more prizes will be expected. Nevertheless, compared
with the situation where organizer intends to maximize expected total e¤ort,
extra prize is seldom needed to maximize expected highest e¤ort. Therefore,
in order to serve di¤erent objectives, specic prize rationing rule should be
adopted, such as the case of Baldrige Awards program and qualication exam.
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CHAPTER 3
R&D Contests with Imperfect Quality Signals
3.1. Introduction
R&D contests are widely used as an e¤ective mechanism to incentivize
innovative e¤ort. Various U.S. federal agencies, for instance, have regularly
sponsored R&D contests to procure valuable innovation to spark technological
breakthroughs. In one case, the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 directs the Department of Energy to o¤er prize incentives for signicant
advances in clean-energy technology; the $50 million H-Prize emerged from this
initiative. Also, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) frequently sponsors
prototype contests, which elicit military innovation by awarding manufacturing
contracts to private rms. The U.S. Air Forces procurement of big microchips
to guide the Minuteman II missile played a pivotal role in stimulating the
development of semiconductor industry when federal agencies were virtually
the sole buyers in this market. Government procurement of aircraft during
the two world wars also jumpstarted the American aviation industry. A more
recent example is the Joint Strike Fighter program aimed at developing a new
generation of a¤ordable stealth jet ghter, in which the Lockheed Martins
X-35 was chosen over Boeings X-32.
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An e¢ cient contest must strike a balance between su¢ cient monetary in-
centives to lure innovative e¤ort and prudent use of the budget. As a result,
one of the typical formats in administering R&D contests is the scoring con-
test, which requires that the administrator assess both the benet and the cost
when procuring innovation. A buyer (e.g., the DoD) species her needs for
a particular innovative solution and invites rms to participate in a contest.
Each rm expends costly e¤ort designing a prototype, submits a prototype,
and proposes a price o¤er. The buyer assesses the quality of competing pro-
totypes, weighs each against its cost, and chooses the design that delivers the
best value for the money, i.e., the maximum buyer surplus.
Despite the popularity of the scoring contest, its e¢ ciency has yet to be
explored more seriously. One natural challenge in practice is to accurately
observe and assess prototypesquality, which can be impeded by many factors.
First, the contest administrator may lack the technical expertise required to
judge prototype quality. Organizations are often plagued by the di¢ culty of
attracting employees with the necessary skills, and this is particularly critical
when the organization searches for frequent innovations to meet evolving needs.
Second, quality appraisal can be biased by human errors or the administrators
personal tastes. Third, innovation naturally involves the uncertainty of trials
and errors; realizing the full value or discovering the hidden defects of a novel
creation can be a lengthy process. For instance, the F-22 raptors oxygen
problems went undetected for ve years. The F-35 ghter also raised extensive
doubts about the Air Forces claim that it was superior to projected opponents.
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We conduct a positive analysis of a scoring contest, in which the quality
appraisal process carries a noise. A buyer invites two rms to participate in
a competitive procurement process for an innovative product. The setting
features a two-dimensional strategy space. A rm maximizes its payo¤ by
choosing a combination of two strategic instruments: One can gain its com-
petitive edge by either/both stepping up quality or/and lowering price. But
because the buyer cannot perfectly observe the true quality of each rms
product, and receives only a noisy signal, she simply chooses the product that
carries the highest perceived surplus. A rms two strategic instruments i.e.,
quality and price di¤er from each other in two aspects: (1) quality is not
perfectly observable, while price is; and (2) quality is an all-paybid, as it
requires up-front payment and a¤ects ones ex post payo¤ regardless of out-
come, while price is a winner-paybid, as it only a¤ects the winners payo¤.
The two-dimensional action space, together with the noisy quality observa-
tion, spawns complex strategic interactions between rms. The overall e¤ects
on rmscompetitive behaviors and the ex post welfare of the buyer remain
unknown a priori.
We provide a formal account of bidding behaviors in a noisy scoring contest.
A unique pure-strategy interior equilibrium may exist in the game. We focus
on such an equilibrium and identify the condition under which it exists. A
symmetric equilibrium emerges when rms are equally capable, i.e., they bear
the same marginal costs in quality investment. Asymmetric equilibrium arises
when there is an e¢ ciency di¤erential: Firms di¤erentiate in their bidding
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strategies, in that one is a quality leader because it delivers a higher quality,
while the other is a price leader because it o¤ers a lower price.1
The equilibrium results allow us to explore the e¢ ciency implications of
noisy appraisal, and generate intriguing and valuable normative implications.
Imperfect quality observation can give rise to both Type I and Type II errors:
The buyer does not necessarily choose the product that promises the highest
net value. This concern naturally casts the e¢ ciency of R&D contests into
doubt. First, a noisy appraisal discounts rmsreturn on their investment in
additional quality, because a superior quality may not be fully appreciated.
We label this a general discouragement e¤ect. Second, a noisy appraisal may
also dilute price competition, because the buyer can mistakenly pay a high
price for a relatively low-quality product, which we label a confusion e¤ect.
Because of this confusion e¤ect, the buyer always su¤ers from a noisier quality
appraisal when competing rms are symmetric.
When rms are asymmetric, however, other competing forces may come
into force, which complicates the e¢ ciency implications. First, recall that
asymmetric rms always di¤erentiate their bidding patterns between quality
and price leadership. Firmsability to substitute between quality improve-
ment and price undercutting gives rise to a di¤erentiation e¤ect. Note that
the marginal return on a rms quality investment is inversely related to the
quality provided by the rival rm: A superior quality is more likely to over-
come the buyers observation errors and be recognized and rewarded when the
1The quality leader can be either the stronger (more e¢ cient) rm or the weaker (less
e¢ cient).
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rival rms intrinsic quality decreases. This means that one rms quality re-
duction, triggered by the general discouragement e¤ect, tends to encourage the
other to step up its quality investment. Conversely, when one rm leaps frog
in quality, the other must have an even weaker incentive to invest in quality
and is compelled to regain its competitive edge by undercutting in price. This
di¤erentiated bidding prole, which is triggered when rms are asymmetric,
may benet the buyer; benets arise from two sources. First, note that the
quality leader must ask for a higher price to compensate for its higher R&D
cost. Even so, its ability to raise its price is limited due to the rival rms
undercutting and the noisy quality observation that could potentially under-
value its quality superiority. This allows the buyer, potentially, to receive a
high-quality product while paying a relatively lower price. Second, the di¤er-
entiation e¤ect enlarges the quality di¤erential between rms, so a superior
product is more likely to be identied, which mitigates the buyers observation
errors in quality screening. This observation is remarkable: Firmsdi¤eren-
tiation typically softens competition in a standard oligopolistic market, but
nevertheless could intensify competition and render greater buyer surplus in
this two-dimensional competition.
Second, when rms di¤er in their ability to develop high-quality prototypes,
a noisy appraisal process could alter the playing eld and subtly moderate their
incentives. Analogous to the literature on handicapping in contests, a leveling
e¤ect can be triggered, as the noise diminishes the stronger rms advantage.
A more even playing eld tends to encourage the weaker rm to bid more
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aggressively, either by investing more in quality or more steeply undercutting
its price. It should be noted, however, the leveling e¤ect does not necessarily
leave the buyer better o¤. In spite of the heightened competition, the leveling
e¤ect incentivizes the less e¢ cient rm to invest more in quality, which, in
turn, forces the rm to raise its price and softens price competition.
It remains unclear whether the altered incentives could alleviate the dam-
age caused by ex post mistaken choice. We show that the interaction among
these competing e¤ects gives rise to a generally nonmonotonic relationship
between the buyers expected surplus and the magnitude of the noise. In par-
ticular, the buyer can be strictly better o¤ when compared to a benchmark
case, in which she is able to perfectly observe the quality of rmsproducts.
The gain could be seen in both her expected surplus and expected quality of
the winning bid. This observation yields interesting implications. Previous
studies (Biglaiser, 1993; Emmons, 1997; Taylor, 1995; Wolinski, 1993; and
Dai, Lewis, and Lopomo, 2006) suggest that a buyer often has to seek experts
recommendations if she is not qualied to evaluate the product she attempts
to procure. Our ndings, however, show that expertise does not necessarily
pay o¤. This challenges the popular belief that an organization must assign
tasks to experts with the best matching skills, since a noisy quality appraisal
does not necessarily hurt the buyer.
Surprisingly, we show that in a noisy scoring contest, the buyers expected
surplus could increase when the asymmetry between the two rms increases,
i.e., when the less e¢ cient rm has to bear an even higher cost to develop
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a high-quality product. The reason is straightforward: The magnied e¢ -
ciency di¤erential further catalyzes the aforementioned di¤erentiation e¤ect.
We elaborate more on this observation after presenting our formal results.
These observations shed light on a classical question in the contest literature:
How does one select the most desirable contenders for a contest? Our ob-
servations show that it may not be optimal to shortlist the most competent
candidates. It is also well known that in a conventional contest setting, a more
balanced playing eld creates more competition. We nevertheless demonstrate,
in this two-dimensional setting, that performance could improve when partic-
ipants are more uneven in terms of competence.
The overall e¢ ciency of the contest may also improve because of these
interactions: The di¤erentiation e¤ect may direct the more e¢ cient rm to
provide superior quality and the less e¢ cient one to recede, which helps avoid
socially waste and reduce costs. We show that a Pareto-dominant outcome,
compared to the benchmark case with perfect quality appraisal, could para-
doxically arise, in which case all parties involved are better o¤.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides
a brief review of relevant literature. Section 3.3 sets up a general model and
presents preliminary results. Section 3.4 characterizes the pure-strategy equi-
librium in a more tractable setting and provides relevant comparative statics.
Section 3.5 compares the results obtained in a noisy contest to those in the
benchmark case. Section 3.6 concludes this paper.
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3.2. Relation to Literature
A growing literature has emerged to explore the strategic behavior and op-
timal design of R&D procurement contests in a wide variety of environments.
Taylor (1995) and Fu, Lu, and Lu (2012) study the optimal xed-prize R&D
contest. Che (2003) shows that a scoring R&D contest dominates a xed-
prize tournament under a deterministic innovation technology. In contrast,
Schöttner (2008) nds that if a buyer cannot charge entry fees, she may prefer
a xed-prize tournament to a rst-price auction in a stochastic environment.
Ding and Wolfstetter (2012) explore the optimal R&D contest when the inno-
vators are allowed to bypass the contest and the buyer cannot commit to not
bargaining with bypassing innovators. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) investi-
gate the optimal screening scheme for selecting the most qualied contestants
in an R&D contest.
A handful of studies analyze the optimal information revelation in procure-
ment schemes. Gal-Or et al. (2006) identify the optimal information revelation
schemes for sequential and simultaneous games. Kaplan (2012) investigates
whether the buyer should inform contestants of her preference.
In particular, our study is closely related to those by Che and Gale (2003)
and Burguet and Che (2004). Che and Gale demonstrate that an optimal con-
test should handicap the stronger rm. They also show that a scoring contest
provides more surplus to the buyer than a xed-prize tournament, because the
former format allows the less e¢ cient rm to compete by asking for a small
price, which also levels the playeld. Our paper can be viewed as a direct
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extension of Che and Gale: They assume that quality is perfectly observed,
while we assume that it is not. In an auction setting, Burguet and Che (2004)
study competitive procurement, in which a corrupted agent manipulates his
evaluation of product quality in exchange for bribes. They show that the buyer
is better o¤when her agent has only moderate manipulative power. A leveling
e¤ect is triggered by the corrupted manipulation: A corrupted agent gives the
weaker bidder a chance to win, thereby creating more competition. It should
be noted that a few critical di¤erences exist between our paper and Burguet
and Ches. First, Burguet and Che allow rms to propose bribes to the agent,
who, if he accepts, adds a xed increment to the quality rating of the rm
o¤ering the higher bribe. Firms randomize their bribes in equilibrium, which
causes the buyers judgment errors. In contrast, in our setting the buyers
observation error is purely exogenous, stochastic, and independent of rms
strategic activities. Second, Burguet and Che consider an auction setting, in
which no up-front costs are sunk for their bids (i.e., price, product quality, or
bribes) before the winner is chosen. In contrast, we adopt a setting similar to
Che and Gales, in which rmsinvestment in prototype quality is nonrefund-
able, so each rm chooses a mix of two elements i.e., quality and price in
its bid.
Our paper is related to the literature on procurement that involves mul-
tidimensional evaluation, which includes studies by Che (1993) and Asker
and Cantillon (2010). These studies typically consider auction mechanisms
in which products characteristics can be perfectly observed, so the highest
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bidder always wins. They also assume that quality (or other nonprice fac-
tors) is given, so sellers bids do not involve all-pay elements. In a recent
study, Giebe and Schweinzer (2013) also introduce a noisy element in the ap-
praisal process, such that the buyer cannot perfectly identify the best o¤er.
In contrast to our setup, Giebe and Schweinzer assume that product quality
is exogenously given and determined prior to bidding.
Our paper is naturally linked to the literature on multidimensional con-
test. Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010) consider a contest in which each player
performs two activities to produce a composite output, which enters a contest
success function to determine the winner. Both activities are costly regardless
of ones win or loss in Arbatskaya and Mialon. In contrast, in our context, a
rms bid involves one all-pay element (quality) and one winner-pay element
(price), analogous to Che and Gales (2003) study. Melkonyan (2013) con-
siders an interesting hybrid contest: A contestant exerts a nonrefundable
e¤ort (all-pay element) and also promises a payment to voter if he wins
(winner-pay element). In both studies, the two elements in a contestants bid
are converted into a single variable, which enters a Tullock contest success
function. In our paper, the two elements in ones bid play qualitatively dif-
ferent roles in determining the winning outcome, because quality cannot be
perfectly observed. Therefore, they cannot be converted into a single variable.
Our paper is also related to the stream of literature that stresses the lev-
eling e¤ect of an imprecise performance-evaluation mechanism in asymmetric
contests. When contestants di¤er in their abilities, a noisier contest balances
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the playing eld, thereby encouraging weaker contestants to bid more intensely
and deterring stronger ones from shirking. OKee¤e, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser
(1984) were among the rst to formalize this logic. This rationale is fur-
ther elaborated on by Che and Gale (1997, 2000), Fang (2002), Nti (2004),
Amegashie (2009), and Wang (2010). This e¤ect also arises in our setting.
However, a substantially richer strategic interaction emerges in our setting be-
cause of the two-dimensional nature of this bidding game. Furthermore, as
stated previously, the leveling e¤ect has ambiguous welfare implications for
the buyer, because it compels the less e¢ cient rm to conduct more R&D,
which forces it to raise its price.
3.3. Setup and Preliminaries
A buyer seeks an innovative product a new weapons system, technology
to streamline a rms manufacturing process, or a vaccine to curb the spread
of an epidemic. Two rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, are invited to participate in a
procurement contest. They simultaneously submit their bids to compete for a
contract. The bid includes an intrinsic quality xi of its prototype and a price
o¤er pi. To design and produce a prototype of a quality xi, the rm has to
sink an R&D cost 	i(xi). The cost function 	i() is strictly increasing in its
argument, second-order di¤erentiable and strictly convex, with 	i(0) = 0 ,
	0i(0) < 1 and limxi"1	
0
i(xi) > 1. The two rms are allowed to be hetero-
geneous in terms of their ability to develop and deliver high-quality design.
Without loss of generality, we assume that rm 1 is more e¢ cient than rm
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2, with 	1(x)  	2(x), for all x > 0. For simplicity, we assume 	1(x) = 	(x)
and 	2(x) = c	(x), with c  1. The R&D cost functions are common knowl-
edge between the competing rms.
A procurement o¢ cer, who seeks the maximum buyer surplus, evaluates
the quality of each prototype. Dene si = xi   pi, which is the actual buyer
surplus a rm i o¤ers. However, the intrinsic quality of a prototype cannot
be perfectly observed or veried. Instead, the o¢ cer receives a noisy signal
~xi  xi + "i, where the additive term "i is a random shock to the observation
of quality xi and is independently and identically distributed with zero mean.
A rms prototype is thus perceived to provide a buyer surplus ~si = ~xi   pi =
(xi   pi) + "i.
To ease our analysis, we assume that the opportunity cost of failed pro-
curement is su¢ ciently high that the buyer always makes a purchase, and the
rm that o¤ers a higher perceived surplus ~si, i.e., (xi pi)+"i > (xj pj)+"j,
i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j, would win the procurement contract.2 Tie is broken
randomly.
The condition for a rm is win can equivalently be written as ("j   "i) <
si   sj. For analytical convenience, we dene an aggregate noise term " 
"2  "1, which follows a continuous distribution Q(") over the support [ a; a],
where a is strictly positive and nite (a < 1
4
). We further assume that the c.d.f
Q(") is log-concave, with E(") = 0 and V ar(") = 22. Note that this game
2One may alternatively interpret xi as an incremental improvement to the quality of an
existing industry standard. A rms product provides a nontrivial basic value to the buyer
without additional quality investment. So the buyer is always willing to make a purchase
by choosing one of the two alternatives.
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is di¤erent from standard contests, which typically assume xed rent. In our
context, the buyer decides on her payment based on the perceived quality. A
nite a implicitly sets a cap on the buyers potential payment.
Firmswinning probabilities i(s1; s2), for given (s1; s2), can be written,
respectively, as
1 = Q(s1   s2) and 2 = 1 Q(s1   s2)
Note that a rm wins the contract with certainty as long as its surplus si
exceeds that of the opponent rm by more than a. Firms simultaneously
choose their bids (xi; pi), with xi; pi  0, to maximize their expected prots
i (i = 1; 2)
i((x1; p1); (x2;p2)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
pi  	i(xi), if si   sj > a;
ipi  	i(xi), if jsi   sjj  a;
 	i(xi), if si   sj <  a:
It deserves to be highlighted that the game cannot simply be reduced to a
unidimensional problem. While a rms winning probability depends on its
actual surplus si, and the rm can improve it by either stepping up quality
xi or reducing price pi, the two elements play subtly di¤erent roles in a rms
strategic trade-o¤s. First, quality cannot be perfectly observed, while the price
is perfectly observable. Second, the former entails a sunk cost and the latter
does not.
50
We further impose the following regularity condition on rms strategy
spaces.
Assumption 3.1. The actual surplus each rm o¤ers to the buyer is
bounded from below, with si = xi   pi   a.
This condition ensures that rmsstrategy spaces are compact sets. We
now characterize several fundamental properties of the game.
Lemma 3.1. In any equilibrium, a rm is quality xi and actual surplus
si are bounded from above by nite upper limits xi and si, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 3.1 arises out of the convex cost function. The upper limits ensure
a nite and regular game. It, together with Assumption 3.1, implies that a
Nash equilibrium must exist.
For the sake of analytical tractability, we focus in this paper on an interior





















































The following proposition, however, establishes a nonexistence condition for
such an interior pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the aggregate noise term follows a log-
concave distribution on [ a; a]. If the distribution of the noise term in quality
observation is highly dense for all points in this range, i.e., the p.d.f q(") is
su¢ ciently large for all " 2 [ a; a], then an interior pure-strategy equilibrium
does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix. 
One intuitive example of the nonexistence condition, i.e., highly dense dis-
tribution, is an excessively small a. Proposition 3.1 simply states that an in-
terior equilibrium would not emerge if the magnitude of the noise is too small.
This result simply states a standard principle in the literature on contests
and tournaments: Pure-strategy equilibrium dissolves when the randomness
of the competition becomes trivial. For instance, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and
Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) show in tournament settings that pure-strategy
equilibrium does not exist when the variance of the additive noise is excessively
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low. It is also well known that a Tullock contest yields no pure-strategy equi-
librium when the contest becomes excessively discriminatory, i.e., the power
parameter r in the contest success function gets overly large.
3.4. Analysis in A Stylized Setting
To gain additional mileage, we now focus on a relatively stylized setting
to obtain more precise predictions. First, we assume that the aggregate noise
" follows a uniform distribution over the support [ a; a]. Second, we assume
that 	(x) takes a quadratic functional form with 	(x) = x2.
Because " is uniformly distributed, a rm is winning probability can be
rewritten as
i((x1; p1); (x2; p2)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if (xi   pi)  (xj   pj)  a;
a+[(xi pi) (xj pj)]
2a
if j(xi   pi)  (xj   pj)j < a;
0 if (xi   pi)  (xj   pj)   a;
for i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j. Our subsequent analysis identies the conditions for
the existence of interior pure-strategy equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium
results, we explore how rmsbehavior and the buyers welfare respond to
various environmental factors.
3.4.1. Benchmark: Symmetric Contest
We rst consider a benchmark case of symmetric competition with c = 1, in
which the two rms are equally competent.
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Proposition 3.2. (Symmetric Contest) When the two rms are equally
e¢ cient in R&D, i.e., c = 1, a unique (symmetric) interior pure-strategy
equilibrium exists if and only if the buyers quality appraisal is su¢ ciently
noisy, i.e., a > 1
8
. In the equilibrium, each rm places a bid (x; p) = (1
4
; a).
They win the contest with equal probability, and the buyer ends up with an
expected surplus p = 14   a.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 3.2 shows that an interior pure-strategy equilibrium uniquely
exists whenever a nontrivial noise is present in quality appraisal. From Propo-
sition 3.2, the following naturally obtains.
Corollary 3.1. In a symmetric contest, i.e., c = 1, the buyer is strictly
worse o¤ when her quality assessment becomes noisier.
Corollary 3.1 is obvious, because p strictly decreases with a. The equi-
librium in the symmetric case clearly embodies the aforementioned negative
e¤ect. Firms adopt the same strategy, i.e., choosing the same intrinsic quality
and asking for the same price, and win the contract with equal probability.
Given the uniform distribution, the magnitude of the noise can intuitively
be measured by the size of a. As the magnitude of the noise ascends, i.e., a in-
creases, quality is held constant at 1
4
, while price strictly increases, which drives
down the buyers actual surplus. A confusion e¤ect arises: Firms e¤ectively
collude by asking for higher prices because of the buyers inability to gauge
product quality precisely. Note that the previously described discouragement
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e¤ect does not literally loom large; ascending noise does not discourage rms
to reduce their quality, but encourages them to raise price.
However, we show that rms behave decidedly di¤erently when they are
asymmetric. Additional e¤ects arise, which may outweigh the negative e¤ects
induced by the noise.
3.4.2. Asymmetric Contest
We now turn to the more interesting case of asymmetric rms with c > 1. We
rst obtain the following to characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. (Asymmetric Contest) A unique interior pure-strategy
equilibrium exists if and only if either of the following conditions holds:3
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2 =   (6a 1)(4ac 1)2[12ac (1+c)] . The buyer receives an expected surplus
p =
(1 + c)  288a3c2 + 84a2c(1 + c)  4a(1 + 6c+ c2)
2[12ac  (1 + c)]2 :
Proof. See Appendix. 
In an asymmetric contest, the existence of an interior pure-strategy equilib-
rium depends not only on the level of noise a, but also on the level of asymme-
try between the rms, i.e., the size of c. The equilibrium exists in two disjoint




< a  1
6c
g
Case 1, and the set f(a; c)j a  1
6
g Case 2. The former set is dened by con-
dition C1 and the latter is dened by condition C2. We demonstrate in the
following gure the regions where the equilibrium exists.
Figure 3.1: Interior Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Comparing rmsbidding strategies in the two cases, we obtain the follow-
ing.
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Corollary 3.2. (i) In Case 1, rm 2 bids more aggressively than rm 1 by
o¤ering a higher actual surplus, i.e., s2 > s

1. Firm 2 provides a higher quality







(ii) In Case 2, rm 1 bids more aggressively than rm 2 by o¤ering a higher
actual surplus, i.e., s1 > s

2. Firm 1 provides a higher quality and charges a







Proof. See Appendix. 
Corollary 3.2 yields interesting observations. As discussed in the intro-
duction, asymmetric bidding patterns emerge when rms di¤er in their cost
functions, with one being a price leader and the other a quality leader. It
deserves to be noted, however, that the stronger rm, i.e., rm 1, which bears
a lower marginal cost in quality improvement, may end up as a price leader
instead of a quality leader which occurs in Case 1. Further, in Case 1, the
initial balance of the contest is reversed, as the weaker rm (rm 2) provides
a more generous surplus.
A closer inspection of rmsbest response correspondence would reveal the
logic of the equilibrium result. Dene BRi(xj; pj) to be a rm is best response
correspondence to its opponents bidding strategy (xj; pj). We have
(3.1) BRi(xj; pj) :






The best response correspondence reveals the nature of the strategic interac-
tion. A rm tends to decrease its quality when the other increases quality
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or reduces price, while it increases its price when the other increases price or
decreases quality.
A noisy quality appraisal tends to discourage both rmsquality invest-
ment. This discouragement e¤ect, however, triggers intricate strategic interac-
tion between asymmetric rms and produces di¤erentiated responses. Under
noisy quality appraisal, the larger the intrinsic quality di¤erential, the more
likely that a rms quality advantage will overcome the buyers observation
errors and get recognized. A quality leader, therefore, would reap a higher
marginal return from its quality investment when the rival rm further re-
cedes in quality because of the discouragement e¤ect. This entices the former
to strengthen its quality leadership and ask for a higher price to compensate
for its higher R&D costs; it also forces the latter to resort to price undercut-
ting to regain competitiveness. This mechanism leads to the best-response
correspondence (1), and we call such interaction a di¤erentiation e¤ect.
It should be noted that the more e¢ cient rm (rm 1) ends up being a
price leader instead of quality leader in Case 1. First, as stated previously, a
leveling e¤ect arises. A noisy quality appraisal mitigates the cost disadvantage
of the weaker rm in quality improvement, which could incentivize it to invest
more. Second, rm 1 has an advantage not only in quality improvement but
also in price undercutting: Its cost advantage allows it to demand a lower price
for any given quality. The combination of the two e¤ects, together with the
di¤erentiation e¤ect, leads to the observation in Case 1. The asymmetry be-
tween the two rms remains mild in this case. A moderate noise (1
8




disincentivizes the stronger rm, but incentivizes the marginally disadvanta-
geous rm 2 to improve its quality. This reverses the initial balance and leads
rm 1 to resort to price leadership: Firm 1 would not nd it protable to
deviate from the current equilibrium and regain quality leadership, given its
insignicant cost advantage in quality development.
Case 2 is relatively more straightforward. A large noise (a  1
6
) exercises a
signicant discouragement e¤ect, which o¤sets the leveling e¤ect and thereby
restores the initial balance. The di¤erentiation e¤ect continues to loom large:
Firm 1 regains the quality leadership in response to a discouraged rm 2, while
rm 2 resorts to price leadership.
We next discuss how rmsstrategies and the buyers surplus are a¤ected
by the noise and the e¢ ciency di¤erential between rms, which further reveals
the intuition of the equilibrium result.
3.4.2.1. Comparative Statics: Noise. We rst explore the role played by
the noise. Given the uniform distribution, the magnitude of the noise can
intuitively be measured by the size of a. The following observations are rst
obtained, which illustrate the intricate interaction between rms triggered by
the noise.
Proposition 3.4. In both cases (Cases 1 and 2), the quality of rm 1s









> 0; rm 2 raises its prices when a larger noise




> 0, while rm 1s response is nonmonotonic.
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The comparative statics further illuminate the strategic interactions dis-
cussed above. A noisier quality appraisal exercises a discouragement e¤ect.
However, its negative e¤ect on the weaker rm, i.e., rm 2, is always counter-
acted by the di¤erentiation e¤ect and leveling e¤ect. The former increases rm
2s marginal return from quality improvement (because of the lower quality
o¤ered by rm 1), while the latter diminishes rm 1s cost advantage so as
to provide rm 2 with additional incentive. Both tend to encourage rm 2 to
step up its R&D e¤ort. We therefore observe the opposite moves of x1 and x

2
in response to an increase in a.
As rm 2 increases its quality when the noise enlarges, the additional in-
vestment drives up its cost, which forces it to ask for a higher price as compen-
sation. Firm 1s price response, however, involves more complication. Recall
that a rm can outperform its opponent in two avenues, either superior quality
or lower price. On the one hand, it tends to reduce its price to substitute for
its lower quality. On the other hand, the higher price charged by its opponent
softens price competition, which, together with the uncertain quality compar-
ison, allows it to follow suit. The combination of the two e¤ects leads to the
mixed observations in the movement in p1. For brevity, the detailed result of
@p1
@a
is omitted in the text, but is provided in the Appendix (Table 3.1).
We now evaluate how the buyers expected surplus in the interior pure-
strategy equilibrium responds to an increase in the magnitude of the noise.
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2 + 2cf1 + c+ c2   864a3c2 + 216a2c(1 + c)  6a[5 + c(2 + 5c)]g
[12ac  (1 + c)]3 :




< a  1
6c
), the buyers
expected surplus p changes nonmonotonically with a. Specically, there exist
two cuto¤s, c 2 (1; 4
3




) for c and a, respectively. The expected
surplus p decreases with a, i.e.,
@p
@a
< 0, when 1 < c < c and 1
8
< a < a; it
increases with a, i.e., @p
@a
 0, whenever a  a or c  c.
(ii) In Case 2 (a  1
6




Proof. See Appendix. 
In Case 2, the buyers expected surplus strictly decreases with a, which
implies that the buyer is always worse o¤ when her quality assessment is less
precise. In Case 1, the relation between her expected surplus and the mag-
nitude of noise is nevertheless nonmonotonic, and a larger noise could para-
doxically improve the buyers expected surplus. The following result further
illuminates the source of gain and loss.
Corollary 3.3. In both cases, rm 1 provides a lower surplus as the mag-




< 0, while the surplus provided by rm
2, i.e., s2, varies nonmonotonically.
Corollary 3.3 states that rm 1 always supplies a smaller surplus when the
noise increases, while rm 2s response is indenite. We provide the detailed
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comparative statics in Appendix. As a result, any improvement in the buyers
expected surplus must be contributed by a more competitive rm 2, which
could more than o¤set the reduction in s1.
Corollary 3.3 implies that any improvement of p requires that rm 2 be
incentivized su¢ ciently. In Case 1, the combination of the di¤erentiation e¤ect
and leveling e¤ect compels rm 2 to gain a quality leadership. Further, rm
2s ability to raise its price to cover its higher R&D cost is constrained because
of the pressure from rm 1s price undercutting. These e¤ects could allow the
buyer to enjoy a competitive price without su¤ering a loss in quality.
When a becomes large, i.e., a  1
6
, the general discouragement e¤ect
which is imposed on both rms becomes excessively large. It outweighs the
second-order leveling or di¤erentiation e¤ect, thereby leading to the strictly
negative relationship between p and a.
The observation of Proposition 3.5 yields interesting and subtle implica-
tions. In Case 1, increasing noise exerts a negative e¤ect on the expected buyer
surplus p, only when (1) the noise remains in a lower range (18 < a < a
) and
(2) the inter-rm asymmetry is insignicant (1 < c < c). First, a signicant
leveling e¤ect requires a nontrivial noise: A substantial noise is required to
su¢ ciently handicap rm 1 so as to incentivize rm 2 to leapfrog. Second, the
noise and the e¢ ciency di¤erential (c) interact intricately to trigger the di¤er-
entiation e¤ect. Recall corollary 3.1, which states that in a symmetric contest
the buyer always su¤ers from a larger noise, because in that case symmetric
rms play the same bidding strategy: A confusion e¤ect comes into play and
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allows rms to e¤ectively collude. A signicant di¤erentiation e¤ect can be
catalyzed only when rms substantially di¤er from each other. Firmsbidding
patterns tend to converge when they get closer in terms of their competence.
This revives the confusion e¤ect, while stiing the di¤erentiation e¤ect. We
further explore the role played by c in the next subsection.
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The following results can be obtained.
Proposition 3.6. When the noise enlarges,









Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 3.6 reveals the contrasting impacts of the noise on the expected
quality of the winning product in the two cases. When the noise remains small,
a larger noise improves the quality. The e¤ect, however, would be reversed
when a is large. As shown above, rm 1 always decreases its quality, while rm
2 always increases it. This demonstrates the tension between the competing
e¤ects: The discouragement e¤ect tends to disincentivize both rms, while
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the di¤erentiation and leveling e¤ects encourage quality investment from the
quality leader, i.e., rm 2. When the noise becomes excessively large, neither
rm would expect a signicant return on investment in quality, so the rst-
order discouragement e¤ect must prevail.
3.4.2.2. Comparative Static: E¢ ciency Di¤erential. We now investi-
gate the e¤ect of e¢ ciency di¤erential c. We rst evaluate how the buyers
expected surplus varies with the level of e¢ ciency di¤erential. Evaluating p




2 + 1  22a)c  (2a  1)]
2[12ac  (1 + c)]3 :
We obtain the following.
Proposition 3.7. In both cases (1 and 2), the buyers expected surplus
responds nonmonotonically to the increase in c: p decreases rst with c until
c reaches a cuto¤ 2a 1
(18a 1)(4a 1) and then increases, i.e.,
@p
@c
S 0 if and only if
c S 2a 1
(18a 1)(4a 1) .
Proof. See Appendix. 
The result shows that under a given level of noise a, the buyer may or may
not su¤er from a more asymmetric contest, i.e., a less competent rm 2. An ex
ante more asymmetric contest could, paradoxically, lead to a higher expected
buyer surplus. To better understand the logic, we further examine impacts of
c on individual rmsequilibrium behavior, i.e., their responses to an increase
in c in their choice of quality, price, and the actual surplus o¤ered.
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Proposition 3.8. When the e¢ ciency di¤erential enlarges, i.e., c in-
creases,
(i) In Case 1, rm 1 decreases its quality, lowers its price, and reduces
its actual surplus o¤er, while rm 2 increases its quality, raises its price, and





















(ii) In Case 2, rm 1 increases its quality, raises its price, and increases
its actual surplus o¤er, while rm 2 decreases its quality, lowers its price, and



















Proof. See Appendix. 
In both cases, ascending asymmetry enlarges the di¤erentiation in rms
bidding strategies. The quality leader further increases its quality while ask-
ing for a higher price to cover its additional cost, and the price leader further
undercuts while reducing its quality accordingly. In short, a larger e¢ ciency
di¤erential widens the di¤erentiation between rmsstrategies, such that both
quality and price di¤erentials are enlarged. Such interaction leads to the non-
monotonic relationship between e¢ ciency di¤erential and the buyers expected
surplus: The buyer may benet from increased di¤erentiation. First, an en-
larged intrinsic quality di¤erential helps the buyer overcome observation error
and recognize the superior product, which mitigates the confusion e¤ect. Sec-
ond, the price leaders further undercutting restricts the quality leaders ability
to shift its cost burden to the buyer by asking for a higher price.
However, the specic mechanisms di¤er subtly between the two cases. In
Case 1, the quality leader (rm 2) counterintuitively raises its quality further
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when its own R&D costs increase. Two additional forces counteract the rst-
order negative e¤ect of a higher cost. First, a higher c implies that it becomes
more di¢ cult for rm 2 to o¤er an attractive price while o¤ering a superior
quality, which deteriorates its competitiveness in terms of price and, in turn,
forces it to step up its R&D e¤orts to remain competitive on quality. Second,
for rm 1, undercutting becomes more protable: It is less likely to trigger a
reciprocal price cut, because the rival rm (rm 2) becomes less able to match
its price while maintaining its quality leadership. This fact compels rm 1 to
further lower p1, thereby enlarging the di¤erentiation.
In contrast, in Case 2, rm 1 which bears a lower cost for quality development
takes quality leadership. The rst-order negative e¤ect of a higher cost domi-
nates in this scenario: Firm 2, as the price leader, would be further disincen-
tivized in quality supply and resort to additional price undercutting to remain
competitive. This spurs rm 1 to maintain its lead by further improving its
quality. Again, rm 1s ability to shift its cost burden is limited by rm 2s
continued price undercutting.
It should be noted that in Case 2, the increased di¤erentiation caused by
an increase in c also leads to overall e¢ ciency gain: The more e¢ cient rm
(rm 1) provides higher quality, while the less e¢ cient rm (rm 2) invests
less in quality, which allows for a more e¢ cient division of labor and reduces
the overall cost of quality provision in the contest.
The implications of these observations contrast with those of the exist-
ing literature. Our results show that the buyer does not necessarily su¤er
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when rm 2 (the weaker rm) becomes even less competent. Che and Gale
(2003) show that the buyer prefers to shortlist the two most e¢ cient rms
to participate in her bidding competition. This principle, however, does not
universally hold in our setting. Conventional wisdom in the contest literature
holds that a more balanced playing eld intensies competition. For instance,
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) demonstrate that a contest organizer
may exclude the strongest contestant to even the competition. Nevertheless,
our results show that a more uneven playing eld could help.
The expected quality of the winning product qwin also varies nonmonoton-
ically with c. For brevity, details are not provided in the text, but are included
in the Appendix (Table 3.2).
3.5. Discussion
In this part, we rst compare a noisy contest to a benchmark model without
observation error in quality appraisal. We then explore the possibility of other
equilibria.
3.5.1. Comparison to Benchmark Case
In this part, we compare the equilibrium outcome of the noisy contest model
with that of a benchmark model, in which the appraisal process involves no
noise, i.e., a = 0. The benchmark model can then be viewed as a special case
of Che and Gales (2003) setting. We maintain all other assumptions, so the
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benchmark models setup remains identical to that of the model analyzed in
Section 4, except that quality is perfectly observable.
We directly borrow Che and Gales (2003) analytical approach. Because
of the perfect observability of quality, there is a unique combination of quality
and price for a given level of surplus s a rm wants to o¤er. Therefore, a rms
strategy can be reduced to a unidimensional choice of surplus s. As shown
by Che and Gale, only mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in the benchmark
model. Their equilibrium results can be directly adapted for our purpose. Let
the surpluses o¤ered by the two rms, s1 and s2, follow distributions Ga1()
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We further compute the expected quality of the winning product qwinb . By
the result of Che and Gale (2003), for each given level of surplus s, a rm
i would choose a quality xbi 2 arg min
x2R+
bi+	i(x)






and rm 2s expected prot b2 = 0. As a result, x
b
i can be uniquely




























































2   (1  1
2c
)3]:
In the remainder of this section, we rst explore whether a nonexpert buyer
can end up with a higher expected buyer surplus in the noisy contest. Second,
we investigate whether the quality of the winning product necessarily su¤ers
from her imperfect judgment. Third, we investigate whether a Pareto dom-
inant improvement can be possible when the buyer is subject to observation
error. That is, under imperfect quality appraisal, both the buyer and the rms
get better o¤, as compared to the benchmark case.
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3.5.1.1. Expected Buyer Surplus. Dene  = p   b, which gives the
di¤erence in the buyers expected surplus between our model and the bench-
mark case. Our equilibrium analysis yields
 =
1 + c  288a3c2 + 84a2c(1 + c)  4a(1 + 6c+ c2)

















Our numerical exercises provide mixed observations. Figure 3.2 demon-
strates one example.
Figure 3.2: Expected Surplus : Comparison
The gure shows that the buyer can either su¤er or benet from her imper-
fect judgment. Indeed, the expected surplus in the noisy contest can surpass
that under the benchmark setting. The gain or loss depends complexly on
both the magnitude of the noise and the level of e¢ ciency di¤erential. Our
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subsequent analysis explores the roles played by these factors on the compar-
ison.
We rst consider the impact of the e¢ ciency di¤erential between rms.






















3(6a  1) f(1 + c) + 2a[(36a  11)c  1]g
[(1 + c)  12ac]3

:
Proposition 3.9. The di¤erence in the buyers expected surplus, ,
strictly increases with c, i.e., @
@c
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Under a given level of noise, when the gap between rms competence
is su¢ ciently large, the buyer is more likely to obtain excess surplus. The
intuition is straightforward: The noise triggers the di¤erentiation e¤ect and
the leveling e¤ect, while both of them can be signied when rms di¤er more
in their abilities, which allow the noisy contest to outperform.
Because a is irrelevant to b, @@a is no di¤erent from
@p
@a
. As implied by our
previous result, a nonmonotonic relationship can be found in Case 1. However,
in Case 2, a only plays a negative role because p strictly decreases with a. As
a result, when the level of noise continues to rise, the trade-o¤ must be tilted
toward the benchmark contest (with perfect quality observation). Despite the
monotonic relationship between expected buyer surplus p and a, it deserves to
note that in Case 2, the buyer may still earn a greater surplus than she would
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in benchmark case, although the gain, if any, must diminish as a continues to
increase. We further establish the following.





The buyer can never earn a higher expected surplus than she would do in the
benchmark setting, as long as the level of noise exceeds this upper bound, i.e.,





Proof. See Appendix. 
The proposition shows that the benchmark contest must prevail when the
quality appraisal becomes excessively noisy, in which case the discouragement
e¤ect would dominate those positive e¤ects.
3.5.1.2. Expected Quality of the Winning Product. We have demon-
strated that the buyer may get better o¤with imperfect observation of quality.
However, the comparison is entirely based on her expected buyer surplus. An-
other issue also merits attention: Does the imperfect observation necessarily
reduce the expected quality of the procured product?
We rst dene qwin = qwin  qwinb , which is the di¤erence in the expected
quality of the winning product between noisy contest and benchmark model.
It is given by
qwin =
1 + c(1 + 12a( 2 + 3a(1 + c)))


























Again, our numerical exercises yield mixed observations. The expected
quality qwin may either exceed or fall below that in the benchmark case.
Figure 3.3: Expected Quality of Winning Product:
Comparison
In the benchmark model, the expected quality of winning product is inde-
pendent of the magnitude of noise. Proposition 3.6 thus implies that qwin
increases with a in Case 1, while it decreases in Case 2.
As demonstrated in Figure 3.3, qwin changes with c nonmonotonically.
The comparison varies with respect to the change in c complexly, and the
comparative statics are ambiguous. We do not include the detail in the paper
for brevity.
3.5.1.3. Welfare and E¢ ciency. We now compare the resultant social wel-
fare in the noisy contest to the outcome of the benchmark case. In our noisy
contest model, the overall social welfare is dened as the sum of the two rms
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expected prots and the buyers expected surplus. We have
SW = 1 + 2 + p
=
1 + c[1 + 12af3a(1 + c)  2g]
4[(12a  1)c  1]2 :
Again, we borrow the analysis of Che and Gale (2003) for the benchmark
case. In this case, the overall social welfare SW b is given by



























Dene SW  SW   SW b. The comparison gives
SW =























Our numerical exercise yields mixed observations and complexly nonmonotonic
relations between SW and a or c. The noisy contest may or may not ren-
der a higher overall social welfare than the benchmark model. The noise may
trigger various competing e¤ects, which would a¤ect both the intensity of the
competition and social welfare indenitely. As discussed previously, the dif-
ferentiation e¤ect could lead to e¢ ciency gain, as it avoids duplicated R&D
investments and social waste.
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It should be noted that rm 2 must gain from the noise. By Che and
Gale (2003), the weaker rm must end up with zero prot in the equilibrium.
However, in our context it always ends up with a positive expected prot. As
we have shown, the buyer may also gain. An interesting question remains:
Is a Pareto-dominant outcome likely i.e., both the buyer and the two rms
are better o¤ when the buyers quality appraisal is noisy? Our numerical
exercise demonstrates that such Pareto improvement is likely. The set of pa-
rameterizations is illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 3.4. All parties are
better o¤, as compared to the benchmark case.
Figure 3.4: Pareto Improvement
The shaded area is a subset of the parameterizations dened by Case 2, in




Our paper has mainly focused on the interior pure strategy equilibrium. We
have shown that this is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium under the para-
meterizations dened by Cases 1 and 2. We now briey discuss the possibility
of other equilibria.
Recall that Cases 1 and 2 are dened by the two disjoint sets of










(a; c)j a  1
6
	
, respectively. An interior pure-strategy equilibrium re-
quires a nontrivial noise with a > 1
8
. We rst obtain the following result,
which rules out a pure-strategy equilibrium when a is excessively small, as
proposition 3.1 generally predicts.




Proof. See Appendix. 
Another type of pure-strategy equilibrium would exist, however, when the





Proposition 3.12. When 1
8c
 a  1
8
, there exists a pure-strategy equilib-






 a) and rm 2 bids (x2 = 0; p2 = 0).
Proof. See Appendix. 
In such an equilibrium, rm 1 wins the contract with probability one, while
rm 2 is squeezed out and stays inactive, i.e., making zero quality investment
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and asking for zero price. This contrasts with the interior equilibrium, in which
both rms actively compete and win with positive probabilities.
Propositions 2, 11, and 12 exhaust all the possibilities of pure-strategy
equilibria. However, mixed-strategy equilibria must exist in this game, espe-
cially when the noise reduces to a lower level. Characterizing mixed-strategy
equilibria in contests with small noise has long been a nagging problem in
the literature, e.g., Tullock contests with large r. The conventional approach
to identifying mixed-strategy equilibrium in perfectly discriminatory contests,
such as all-pay auctions or Che and Gales (2003) scoring contests, does not
apply in noisy contests. Consider a conventional all-pay auction. Playersbids
are capped by the same upper bound, as the maximum bid allows one to win
with probability one because of perfect observation, so that nobody has an
incentive to bid more than it. Identifying the tight upper bound further al-
lows playersequilibrium payo¤s to be pinned down, which paves the way for
characterizing the equilibrium bidding strategy. This approach, however, loses
its bite in our context: Overbidding does not guarantee a sure win because
of the noise in quality appraisal, which makes it di¢ cult to identify the up-
per supports for rmsbid distributions. Further, it is di¢ cult to convert the
two-dimensional strategy space into a unidimensional one. In Che and Gale
(2003), a given level of actual surplus provided by a rm always leads to the
same winning probability, regardless of the particular mix of price and quality.
Hence, there exists an optimal combination of quality and price for each given
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surplus it is inclined to o¤er. A rms mixed strategy can then be charac-
terized as a distribution of the surplus it o¤ers. This approach, however, has
limited utility in our context, because quality cannot be perfectly observed,
while price can. These nuances complicate the analysis, which deserves future
research.
3.6. Conclusion
We study a noisy R&D contest, in which a buyer cannot precisely gauge
the quality of bidding rmsproducts. We identify an interior pure-strategy
equilibrium in which both rms compete actively. We show that the expected
buyer surplus in the noisy contest could paradoxically surpass that in a setting
in which the quality can be perfectly appraised. We also demonstrate that in a
noisy contest, the buyer can end up with strictly higher surplus when compet-
ing rms are more asymmetric in terms of their ability to deliver high-quality
prototypes. This challenges the conventional wisdom that a contest gains in
e¢ ciency with a more balanced playing eld. Our results also yield interest-
ing implications for organizational design. In our setting, a nonprofessional
buyer who is unable to judge the quality of submissions perfectly may turn
out to perform better and obtain a higher level of buyer surplus. Professional
expertise does not necessarily pay o¤.
Our study leaves a room for future extension. For the sake of analyt-
ical tractability, we assume that the noise term follows a uniform distribu-
tion. All other usual distributions e.g., exponential distribution or normal
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distribution would lead to a set of highly nonlinear equations when charac-
terizing the equilibrium in a two-dimensional game, which prevent us from
obtaining closed-form solutions and precise predictions on rmsbehavior and
the buyers welfare. The uniform distribution provides a convenient approxi-
mation to model a noisy quality assessment process. It allows us to investigate
the impact of the noise on the contest by varying the parameter a. However,
it remains intriguing to what extent these predictions would extend under al-




Pro rata or Fixed : The Price Strategy of
Crowdsourcing Contest Intermediaries
4.1. Introduction
With the rapid development of Internet technology, crowdsourcing soliciting
contributions from a large group of people, and especially from an online
community rather than from traditional employees or suppliers to obtain ser-
vices, ideas, or content has proliferated among entrepreneurs. And examples
of crowdsourcing are numerous, from marketing plans, logo design, and pro-
duction to technology solutions. One of the earliest instances of crowdsourcing
was the Oxford English Dictionary. In the mid-19th century, an open call was
made for volunteers to identify all the words in the English language and sub-
mit quotations exemplifying their usage. Over the next 70 years, six million
submissions were received. Today, crowdsourcing occurs mainly on the Inter-
net. Employers can reach a pool of talent around the world this way, and, on
the other side, individuals tend to be more open in web-based projects where
they are not being physically scrutinized and can thus feel more comfortable
participating.
In the commercial world, crowdsourcing can be implemented e¤ectively
in various forms, including crowdvoting, wisdom of the crowd, crowdfunding,
80
microwork, creative crowdsourcing, inducement prize contests, etc. In partic-
ular, one form of crowdsourcing has generated great interest in the academic
community: crowdsourcing contest, in which contestants make non refundable
e¤orts to compete for a set of prizes.
Leveraging the wisdom of the crowd in the form of a contest is not rare
among modern entrepreneurs; such contests are executed by professional con-
test intermediaries, such as Topcoder, InnoCentive, Ideaken, etc. The rise in
popularity of contest intermediaries based on easy access to a large pool of
the talented around the world and greatly reduced risk for entrepreneurs. For
example, InnoCentive can reach more than 13 million solvers through their
strategic partners globally, and Topcoder can access to 600,000 of the best
minds around the world. Moreover, with the facilitation function of inter-
mediaries, an entrepreneur only needs to reward positive outcomes instead of
running the risk of project failure. One of the most successful paradigms oc-
curs in the biomedical industry. In 2006, a clinically viable biomarker designed
to measure the progression of ALS  also known as Lou Gehrigs disease 
was invented by Dr. Seward Rutkove in a crowdsourcing contest sponsored by
Prize4Life parterned with InnoCentive. The success of this $1 million challenge
made a decisive contribution to remedy ALS disease.
How do contest intermediaries work? First, the entrepreneur (innovation
seekers) explains the problem and the intermediary (service platform) for-
mulates it as a challenge after gathering necessary information. Second, the
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intermediary posts the challenge to her Internet community and provides ac-
cess to diverse and creative talent from inside the entrepreneurs rm and
from outside. Third, after enabling complete control of challenge distribution
channels and target problem solver audiences, the intermediary oversees the
competition. Lastly, when the contest is nished, the entrepreneur evaluates
the submissions and chooses the winner. InnoCentives work ow is shown in
gure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Contest Intermediary Work Flow
Once the clients subscribe the service from intermediary, the diary prots
of intermediary come from a commission if the results are satisfactory. The
problem for the intermediary lies with her price strategy: how should she
set her commission fee? Intuitively, given the seekers xed crowdsourcing
budget, a higher commission fee means a lower monetary reward for the solver,
which adds the risk of project failure and may even yield zero prot for the
intermediary due to the incentive reduction for contestants. This is called
the discouragement e¤ect. On the other hand, although augmenting monetary
82
rewards for solvers by lowering the commission paid can enhance initiative, the
intermediary will receive less in the event of positive results, which is dened
as the revenue e¤ect. These two e¤ects pose an enormous challenge for the
intermediary.
Therefore, in this paper, we examine the optimal pricing strategy of a
prot-maximizing contest intermediary. Specically, we investigate how the
intermediary balances her commission fee and expected successful rate to op-
timize expected payo¤. We demonstrate that when a monopoly platform can
either charge a pro rata commission contingent on satisfactory submission
quality or a xed payment, regardless of the characteristics of a successful
solution, then the xed payment will be preferred by the intermediary due
to the dominance of the discouragement e¤ect. With an all-pay contest in
an incomplete information environment, when the pro rata commission fee is
determined, the entrepreneur must reserve such payment based on the highest
possible commission. Thus, the benet for solvers is inadequate, in contrast
to the xed fee, by which only the stipulated commission needs to be withheld
and more resources can be used to incentivize contestants.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides
a brief review of relevant literature. Section 4.3 sets up a general model and
presents several preliminary results. Section 4.4 characterizes the optimal
strategy for the intermediary. Section 4.5 discusses the impact of the interme-
diary and the robustness of a single prize. Section 4.6 concludes.
83
4.2. Related Literature
Our work falls into two literature strands: The all-pay auction and crowd-
sourcing contests.
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) provide a rigorous analysis of the
all-pay auction and characterize the equilibria if there are more than two
contestants with complete information. Glazer and Hassin (1998) study the
symmetric equilibria of a multiprizes, complete information model and an in-
complete information model. Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) establish the
unique symmetric (increasing) pure strategy bidding equilibrium for an all-pay
auction with heterogeneous prizes when information is incomplete. Chowd-
hurry (2010) analyzes the situation of an endogenous prize all pay auction
under the complete information where it is possible that none of the bidders
win.
Our paper is closely related to that of Ghosh and McAfee (2014), who
examine the optimal mechanisms for incentivizing high quality outcomes in
crowdsourcing environments when entry is an endogenous, strategic choice for
the contestants. Chawla, Hartline, and Sivan (2011) also focus on the issue
of optimal design in crowdsourcing contests and propose a theory for optimal
crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design.
While these studies mainly focus on the behavior of contestants, we will
concentrate more on strategies for the contest intermediary.
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4.3. Setup and Preliminaries
An entrepreneur seeks an innovative solution for some problems and ap-
proaches to the monopoly intermediary for help. The problem could be sourc-
ing new ideas from unexpected elds, maximizing return on investment, en-
hancing brand value, etc. Then the intermediary formulates the problem into
a challenge by inviting her community of talent, with N contestants to attend.
These risk neutral invitees compete with each other for N non-negative prizes
v1  v2  :::  vN  0 by exerting their non refundable e¤ort simultaneously.
And the highest bid wins the highest prize, the second highest bid wins the
second highest prize, and so on. The values of prizes are public information,
and zero prizes are accommodated as special cases. Every contestant wins one
and only one prize.
We denote player is e¤ort by ei. Exerting an e¤ort ei will cost him eii ,
where i is player is e¤ort e¢ ciency that is his private information. We as-
sume is are independently and identically distributed following a cumulative
distribution function F () on  ,   with density function f() > 0.
Upon completion of the crowdsourcing contest, submissions are forwarded
to the seekers for evaluation. The commission fee is paid by the entrepreneur,
provided the highest bid (e¤ort) satises her intrinsic requirement s0, which
is public information.
The promissory commission payment p can take two forms : pro rata or
xed. In the xed pricing scheme, when the highest e¤ort level h in the
crowdsourcing competition exceeds the entrepreneurs intrinsic requirement
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s0, i.e, h > s0, the invariant intermediary service charge pf is defrayed by the
entrepreneur. In contrast, with the pro rata pricing system, the performance-
contingent commission fee pr is collected. Specially, when the realized highest
e¤ort is above s0 but below the provision for capped e¤ort level s
0
, the com-





will be gathered. In other words, under the pro rata pricing
environment, the commission fee is minfwh;ws0g when h  s0:
Before fully characterizing the intermediarys pricing strategy, we will de-
rive playersequilibrium bidding behavior in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. (Moldovanu and Sela 2006) In an all-pay contest with N
contestants and N nonincreasing prizes denoted by v1  v2  :::  vN 
















(4.2) FNs (t) =
(N   1)!
(s  1)!(N   s)!(1  F (t))
s 1F (t)N s
is a representative contestants probability of winning prize vs.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The monotonic exerting e¤ort level with contestantse¢ ciency type implies
that there always exists a critical type contestant 0, s:t:, if
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 > 0 =) e() > s0
and e(0) = s0.
4.4. Price Strategy Analysis
We now focus on a relatively stylized setting to obtain more precise pre-
dictions. Assume that now the entrepreneur only rewards a single prize v to
the winner, and F () follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1] 1. Therefore,





The critical type of contestant who can satisfy the entrepreneurs intrinsic
requirement s0 is reduced to the form





4.4.1.1. Fixed Commission Scheme. We rst study the simplest case in
which the entrepreneur cannot set the quality requirement for nal submis-
sions autonomously. Instead, intrinsic requirement s0 is exogenously given as
the entrepreneurs quality demand, and the entrepreneur cannot reserve the
prize to the contestants. In the next section, we will relax these restrictions
1The robustness of the single prize will be checked later.
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and endogenize the entrepreneurs quality requirement, in which backward in-
duction will be used to solve the problems of both the intermediary and the
entrepreneur.
Under the xed pricing scheme, a constant commission fee pexf will be
charged by the intermediary when the realized highest e¤ort h  s0. Suppose
the nancial constraint for entrepreneur is I; then the maximum budget that
can be used to reward players is I pexf , and in the single-reward prize system,
v  I   pexf .
Moreover, the monopoly platform needs to design commission pexf carefully
to achieve optimum prot level pexf , which implies that
pexf =Maxpexf
pexf (1  FN(0(pexf ))),
where 0 = f s0N(I pexf )(N 1)g
1
N .
Hence, the optimal xed commission fee is delivered in the following.
Lemma 4.2. In the xed commission scheme, the intermediarys equilib-
rium price strategy is




Proof. See Appendix. 
4.4.1.2. Pro rata Commission Scheme. With the pro rata commission
scheme, the intermediarys earning varies with the performance of the highest
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ability contestant. Specically, we can express the pricing scheme pexr as
pexr =
8><>: 0 when h < s0minfwh;ws0g when h  s0.
Compared with the xed commission scheme, the pro rata system is more
complicated: Not only does the platform have to pick up revenue sharing-ratio
w, but also the capped e¤ort level s
0
has to be designed by the intermediary.
Furthermore, we need to rewrite s
0
in the form of e¤ort strategy to pin down











As the entrepreneur cannot run the risk of default, the highest possible
prize for the winner cannot exceed the ceiling I   ws0. In other words, the
rewarding prize should satisfy
(4.4) v = I   ws0.



















However, the platforms optimal strategy in the pro rata commission scheme
reects the superiority of the xed pricing system, as shown in lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.3. Under the pro rata commission scheme, in equilibrium, the
platform will set s
0




Proof. See Appendix. 
The benet of the pro rata commission system is that optimally, the inter-
mediary can never receive more in terms of service revenue that with the xed
payment scheme.
Corollary 4.1. When an entrepreneurs intrinsic requirement is exoge-
nously given, the optimal pro rata pricing scheme degenerates to a xed scheme.
Proof. The result is obtained from lemma 4.2 and 4.3 directly; one can also
verify that
ws0 = I   v = I  
p
Ns(N   1)I




The dominance of the xed scheme stems from the discouragement e¤ect.
In contrast to a pro rata environment, the innovation budget is e¤ectively
exploit in the xed pricing scenario, as the entrepreneur does not have to
reserve the commission based on the highest possible e¤ort level. Nevertheless,
in the pro rata pricing scenario, once the realized highest e¤ort is less than the
capped e¤ort level, part of the budget will be wasted, which could have been
rewarded to contestants. This money left on the tablescenario renders the
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pro rata commission scheme ine¢ cient, even though the intermediary might
get more when better results are delivered. By the virtual of the dominance of
discouragement e¤ect, the advantage of the revenue e¤ect will be attenuated.
4.4.2. Endogenous Requirement
Despite the intrinsic quality requirement s0, in reality, the entrepreneur does
indeed have the freedom to set the quality standard of submissions as the
intermediary is customer-oriented. In this section, we remove restraints on
the entrepreneurs exogenous quality requirement and inability to reserve the
prize for contestants and deepen our analysis to consider the endogenous case.
Specically, we assume that the entrepreneur can arbitrarily set submission
quality threshold r upon defraying the commission fee. Put di¤erently, the
entrepreneur will reward contestants and pay the intermediarys commission
only when the realized highest e¤ort h  r.
Accordingly, when the entrepreneur can withhold the prize, the equilibrium
e¤ort strategy in the single-prize case is derived in the following.
Lemma 4.4. In an all-pay contest with N contestants competing for a
single prize v, if the reserved e¤ort level is r, the unique increasing symmetric











Proof. See Appendix. 
Specically, when contestantse¤ort e¢ ciency follows a uniform distribu-
tion with unit support, i.e., F ()  U [0; 1], the contestants equilibrium e¤ort








In the following sections, we will analyze the intermediarys pricing behav-
ior when the entrepreneur can set quality requirement arbitrarily.
4.4.2.1. Fixed Commission Scheme. Under the xed pricing scheme, the
entrepreneur will reward contestants and pay the xed commission service
charge penf to the intermediary when the realized highest e¤ort h  r. All the
contestants compete for a single prize v = I   penf .
Moreover, by choosing penf carefully, the monopoly platform can achieve
optimum expected prot level penf as follows,
penf =Maxpenf
penf (1  FN(r(penf ))),
where r = f rvg
1
N .
Lemma 4.5. In the xed commission scheme, given entrepreneurs en-
dogenized quality requirement r, the intermediarys equilibrium price strategy
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is
penf = I  
p
rI
Proof. See Appendix. 
4.4.2.2. Pro rata Commission Scheme. By the same token, in this case,
the pro rata commission scheme penr can be simplied as follows:
penr =
8><>: 0 when h < rminfwh;ws0g when h  r.
Here, the capped e¤ort level s
0












The corresponding prize for contestants is
v =














e()FN 1()NdF () + ws
0
[1  (0)N ],
we get the same result as with the exogenous case.
Lemma 4.6. Under the pro rata commission scheme, in the equilibrium,
the platform will set s
0





Proof. See Appendix. 
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The above results again emphasize the dominance of the xed fee scheme,
regardless what quality threshold entrepreneur sets.
Corollary 4.2. Compared to the pro rata pricing scheme, the intermediary
will always prefer a xed access fee to maximize expected payo¤.
Proof. The result is obtained from lemma 4.5 and 4.6 directly. One can also
verify that
wr = I  
p
Ir = penf .

The superiority of the xed pricing scheme in the endogenous case still
originates from the e¢ cient use of the nancial budget, which we discussed in
the previous section.
4.4.3. Optimal Quality Requirement
We know that the intermediary will insist on a xed pricing scheme what-
ever the quality requirement she faces. The next question is how entrepreneur
should set quality requirement r optimally, given intermediarys pricing strat-
egy.
Before we complete present entrepreneurs optimal behavior, her expected
prot f can be written as
Max
r
f = tHE   I[1  FN(r)],
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where HE is the expected highest e¤ort the entrepreneur can achieve and t
is the monetary value for each unit e¤ort. Noted that the entrepreneur only







e()FN 1()NdF ()  I[1  FN(r)].
First, we show that entrepreneur will never set the optimal quality require-
ment below her intrinsic quality standard s0.
Lemma 4.7. The optimal quality requirement r  s0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lowering r below the intrinsic quality requirement s0 merely increases the
successful transaction rate, once the realized highest e¤ort r  h < s0, the
result is valueless for the entrepreneur, but entrepreneur still has to defray the
commission. Accordingly, reducing r below s0 is rarely a wise choice for the
entrepreneur.













IrN ]NN 1d   I(1  rp
rI
).
Evaluating the rst-order condition of (4.5) yields the following result.
95
Lemma 4.8. The optimal quality requirement
r = maxfI f5t+ 3N(2 +N(2 + t))g+ 4
pft+ 3N(2 +N(2 + t))gt
9(1 +N)2t
,s0g.
Proof. The result is obtained from the necessary condition of the existing
optimal solution, in which df
dr
= 0 and r  s0: 
Although lowering the quality threshold will decrease the possibility of
transaction failure, as contestants can fulll assignments more easily with
fewer requirements, the material incentives are reduced for contestants with
higher commission charges, which is adverse to contestantsstrategy behavior.




On the one hand, the intermediary can facilitate the organization of the contest
and the entrepreneurs innovation speed; on the other hand, it could cause
distortion for the optimal quality requirement. In this section, we will take
the optimal quality requirement r as an example to analyze the impact of the
intermediarys function.
For the purpose of comparison, we will only focus on the objective by which







When the entrepreneur resorts to a professional intermediary, by adopting
previous results, the quality requirement r she will propose is given below.





I,s0g when maximizing the expected highest e¤ort.
Proof. See Appendix. 
As noted in this case, the prize value is v =
p
rI. Given the same prize
budget, what is the entrepreneurs best strategy for choosing quality require-
ment r
0
when she can call for a contest without the assistance of an interme-
diary? The answer is shown in lemma 4.10.









Proof. See Appendix. 
Given the identical prize value, when the crowdsourcing contest is imple-
mented via an intermediary, the entrepreneur tends to increase the quality
standard compared to the case in which the entrepreneur hosts it indepen-
dently. Such distortion stems from the entrepreneurs dual reactions, since
the entrepreneur has taken the intermediarys price strategy and contestants
e¤ort level into account. Due to the strong discouragement e¤ect, the entre-
preneur needs to increase its quality threshold to o¤er a higher monetary prize
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for participating contestants in the former situation, despite running the risk
of project failure.
4.5.2. Robustness of a Single Prize
We implicitly assume that the entrepreneur wants to use a single prize to
incentivize contestants, yet the robustness of the single prize has to be checked.
Due to the technical challenge, we will rationalize the optimality of a single
prize by using a two-prizes case.
Suppose the prize budget is V and the entrepreneur can reward (1  )V
to the contestant with the highest e¤ort and V to the contestant with the
second highest e¤ort. By lemma 2.1, the equilibrium e¤ort strategy for each
contestant is
e() = (1  )V A() + V B(),
where




B() = (N   1)
Z 

t[F (t)]N 3[(1 N)F (t) +N   2]f(t)dt.
Nevertheless, the entrepreneur can use the contestants submission only
when the realized highest e¤ort h exceeds her intrinsic quality requirement
s0. Alternatively, the contestant is simply helpful for the entrepreneur when
  0, where e(0) = s0. Moreover, the expected highest e¤ort EH for the






f(1  )V A() + V B()gFN 1()NdF (),
and 0 is a function of .
It turns out that the entrepreneur always prefers a single prize to stimulate
contestants.
Lemma 4.11. The winner-take-all prize structure will be adopted by an
entrepreneur to incentivize contestants when she has the intrinsic quality re-
quirement s0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Even if a second prize can stimulate more e¤ort from low-ability con-
testants, it will demotivate contestants with high e¤ort e¢ ciency, because
the rst prize is reduced compared to a winner-take-all situation. Also, the
entrepreneur intends to maximize expected highest e¤ort, and she needs to
avoid hurting high-type contestants too much, which demonstrate that the
single prize is still optimal.
4.6. Conclusion
With the advent of the Internet, the physical and digital worlds are be-
coming steadily more connected, and it is now possible to reach out large,
targeted populations worldwide. Leveraging the wisdom of crowds in the form
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of contests to serve customersneeds is fairly common among emerging inter-
mediaries, such as Topcoder and InnoCentive. In this paper, we examined the
behavior strategy of a monopoly intermediary who is a prot maximizer, and
in particular, we analyzed the intermediarys price strategy. We found that
given an entrepreneurs xed crowdsourcing budget, the intermediary will al-
ways favor the xed pricing scheme, no matter whether the entrepreneur sets
her quality standard exogenously or endogenously. Intuitively, with the all-pay
contest in an incomplete information environment, when the pro rata commis-
sion fee is arranged, the entrepreneur must reserve this payment based on the
highest possible commission. As a result, the benet for solvers is inadequate,
in contrast to a xed fare, in which only the stipulated commission need to be
withheld and more resources can be employed to incentivize contestants. Al-
though the intermediary can earn more with a higher quality submission in the
pro rata pricing system, this pricing scheme will trigger the discouragement
e¤ect, which could in turn dominate the revenue e¤ect. The superiority of the
xed commission is not merely proved theoretically; practically, the scheme
has been widely employed by intermediaries, such as Topcoder and Ideaken.
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APPENDIX
A: Proofs of Chapter 2
A1: Properties of Gamma and Beta Functions
The results given without proofs are taken from the textbookMilton Abramowitz
and Irene A. Stegun (1972).
Denition A.1. If n is a positive integer, then  (n) = (n  1)!.
Lemma A.1. For any positive number t,  (t+ 1) = t (t).












Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. When there are S prizes, suppose monotone bidding strategy exists,






Adopting the same methodology of Moldovanu and Sela (2006) leads to the




























[1  F ()] dFNs ().

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Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. One can verify that the density of (s;N) is C1Nf()F
N














































where FNs () = 0 for 1  s  N   1. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. According to the proof of lemma 2.2, we know that
Z 






Then E[J((s;N))] strictly decreases with s if J() is an increasing function,
since E[(s;N)]must decrease with s. Apparently, 1NEfJ((s;N))g also decreases
with s: 
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Proof of Lemma 2.4














[1  F ()] dFN1 () =
Z 

[1  F ()] (N   1)FN 2()dF () > 0,
Z 

[1  F ()] dFNN () =  
Z 

(N   1) [1  F ()]N 1 dF () < 0.

Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Under Increasing Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency condition,
R 

[1  F ()] dFNs ()
strictly decreases with s by Lemma 2.3 and when s > s^, we have
R 

[1  F ()] dFNs () <
0. Obviously, rewarding any of the lowest N   s^ contestants would strictly
decrease the expected total e¤ort. 
Proof of Lemma 2.5
Proof. Suppose there are N1 contestants, the optimal number of awarded




[1  F ()] dFN1bs1 ()  0
and Z 

[1  F ()] dFN1bs1+1() < 0
When the number of contestants increases to N2 > N1,
Z 








(bs1   1)!(N2   bs1)!
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F ()N2 bs1dF ()
=
(N2   1)!
(bs1   1)!(N2   bs1)!
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F ()N1 bs1FN2 N1()dF ().
Case 1: If there exists a point such that   1 F ()
f() = 0 , under Increasing
Virtual E¤ort E¢ ciency condition, when  < , J() < 0, otherwise,
J()  0, then
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F ()N1 bs1FN2 N1()dF () >(A.1)
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()





[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F ()N1 bs1FN2 N1()dF () >(A.2)
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F (t)N1 bs1FN2 N1()dF ().
From (A.1) and (A.2), we can get
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()




[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F (t)N1 bs1dF ().
As Z 

[   1  F ()
f()




[   1  F ()
f()
](1  F ())bs1 1F ()N1 bs1FN2 N1()dF () > 0,
which means Z 

[1  F ()] dFN2bs1 () > 0.
Case 2: If 8; J()  0;obviously,
Z 

[   1  F ()
f()




[1  F ()] dFN2bs1 () > 0.

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 (s  1)(k)N s+ 1k (1  k)s 1gdk
=
(N   1)!
(s  1)!(N   s)!f
Z 1
0




(s  1)(k)N s+ 1k (1  k)s 1dkg
=
(N   1)!
(s  1)!(N   s)!f(N   s)
















(s  1)!(N   s)!


















f1  (1 + k)s
1 + kN
g
Furthermore,  (:) is nonnegative and if
R 





Proof of Lemma 2.8
















if bs1 prizes are awarded optimally,




1  (1 + k)(bs1 + 1)
1 + kN
< 0.
When k increases to k
0
, the expected total revenue R
0
if organizer still






















> 1  (1 + k)bs1
1 + kN
 0,
it means when k increases to k
0
;the desired number of prizes will be bs1 at least,
then bs(k;N) is non-decreasing with k: 
Proof of Lemma 2.9
Proof. Assume the optimal number of prizes for N contestants is bs1. Then
















Suppose when the number of contestants increases to n times, the expected












f1  (1 + k)s
1 + knN
g.
Case 1 : If
bs1 > kNn+ 1
n+ kn
,
when nbs1 prizes are awarded,
1  (1 + k)nbs1
1 + knN
< 0.
Then the optimal rewarded prize will be less than nbs1.
Case 2 : If
kNn+ 1
n+ kn








1  (1 + k)n(bs1 + 1)
1 + knN
< 0.
Then the optimal rewarded prize will equal to nbs1:
Case 3: If
bs1 < kNn  k
n+ kn
)




Therefore, the optimal rewarded prize bs2 will be greater than nbs1. 
Proof of Lemma 2.10






























































where FNs () = 0 for 1  s  N   1. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.11











As E[(s;N)] decreases with s, when '(:) is an increasing function, E['((s;N))]
will decrease with s. Therefore,
R 

t(1  FN())dFNs () decreases with s. 
Proof of Lemma 2.12















1  FN() dFN1 () = Z 






1  FN() dFNN () =  Z 

(N   1) 1  FN()N 1 dF () < 0.

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Proof of Lemma 2.13




1  FN() dFNs ()
=
N !
(N   s)!f[N   s 













(N   1)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
1
k
+ 2N   1   (N   s)]
 ( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
 ( 1
k














+ 2N   s  i
1
k





 (N   s+ 1
k
)








1  FN() dFN1 () > 0 and R  1  FN() dFNN () <

















+ 2N   s0   i
1
k

















+ 2N   s  i
1
k





strictly decreases with s, therefore such point s0 is unique. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.15
Proof. From proposition 2.2, we only need to focus on the case where s^h  2.







1  FN() dFNs ()  0g,
and when the number of contestants increases to N + 1, dening






1  FN+1() dFN+1s ()  0g.













+ 2N   s  i
1
k




















+N + 1  i
1
k


















+N + 1  i
1
k
+ 2N   i   1  0.
When the number of contestants increases to N+1, we will discuss the optimal
number of awarded prizes from two cases.
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Case I : If k  1
2
, when the number of contestants increases to N + 1,
k( 1
k

























+ 2N   s^h(N))(1 + 1k + 2N   s^h(N))
( 1
k




+N   s^h(N)) .
Dene






+ 2N   s)(1 + 1
k


















; N; s) = 4N2 + 2N [
1
2










+N + 2  i
1
k









+N + 1  i
1
k
+ 2N   i   1  0
) s^h(N + 1)  s^h(N) when k  12 .
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Case II : If 0 < k < 1
2
, the result will be proved from two steps. Step 1:
s^h(N) is bounded by 1 + 2Nk. As
1
k
+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   i









+ 2N   s  i
1
k






+ 2N   s  1
1
k
+ 2N   1 )
N 1.
Also, when 0 < k < 1
2
, s = 1 + 2Nk,
dk( 1
k












+N   2Nk   1)(
1
k
+ 2N   2Nk   2
1
k











+ 2N   2Nk   1  i
1
k
+ 2N   i  1,
which means s^h(N) < 1 + 2Nk. Step 2: We will prove s^h(N + 1)  s^h(N). If
1 < s^h(N) < 1 + 2Nk, 0 < k < 12 , when the number of contestants increases




f1  s^h(N) + kf4k2 +N [k(s^h(N)  1)  2](s^h(N)  2)
+(s^h(N)  1)(s^h(N)  1 + ks^h(N))gg
>









=  1 + k[1 + (k   2)N ] < 0,
and
a(k; s;N) > a(k; 1 + 2kN;N) = k2N(1 + 2kN) > 0,
)
r(k;N; s^h(N)) > 0
which means in this case, the number of awarded prizes also non-decreases with
the number of contestants.
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Proof of Lemma 2.17
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121
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Proof of Lemma 2.18
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(N   1)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
1
k
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+ 2N   s  i
1
k






+N   1) .
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Dene






+N   1 + (
(N   1)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
1
k






+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  i





+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  ig
+
(N   1)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
1
k





+ 2N   s  i
1
k







+N   1 ,
from Lemma 2.8,
) bs = bkN + 1
1 + k
c.
Next, we will prove 8s > kN+1
1+k



























+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  i) 
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(N   1)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
1
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+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  i .
Denote
h(s) =











+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  i) 





+N   1 +
(N   1)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)
1
k





+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  i
= (N   1)(1
k





















+ 2N   s  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  ig,
) g(s) < h(s).
Then we will prove h(s) < 0 for 8 N  s  2 by induction. If s = 2,
h(2) =   (
1
k
+N   2)(N   1)2N
( 1
k




+ 2N   2)( 1
k
+ 2N   1) < 0.
If
h(s  1) = (N   1)(1
k






















+ 2N   s+ 1  i
1
k

























+ 2N   s+ 1  i
1
k
























+ 2N   s+ 1  i
1
k






















+ 2N   s  i
1
k






+ 2N   s+ 1  i
1
k



































+ 2N   s+ 1  i
1
k
+ 2N   1  i f





+ 2N   1)(1 + 1
k
+N   s)( 1
k
+ 2N   s)g > 0,
and h(s) < 0, 8 N  s  2, s 2 f2; 3; ::; Ng. In other words, g(s) < h(s) < 0,
8N  s > kN+1
1+k
, s 2 f2; 3; ::; Ng. Therefore, bsh  bs. 
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APPENDIX
B: Proofs of Chapter 3
B1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. As rm 1s prot must be nonnegative, which implies 1 = p1  
	(x1)  0, then p1 is bound below 	(x1). Furthermore, an equilibrium
requires si   a, holding the constraint 1 = p1   	(x1) = 0 xed, we
have s1 = x1   	(x1)   a. Recall the assumption of 	0i(0) < 1 and
limxi"1	
0
i(xi) > 1, there exists a point x1 such that x1   	(x1) =  a. If
x1 > x1; x1  	(x1) <  a. Hence, rm 1s quality x1 never exceeds x1 and p1
is bound above x1+a. The same argument applies to rm 2. Particularly, the
surplus organizer can get from rm 1 s1 = x1   p1 is also bounded. Because
the maximum surplus organizer can get is when rm 1 has zero prot, which
is s1 = x1   	(x1). Di¤erentiating s1 = x1   	(x1) with respect to x1 yields
ds1
dx1
= 1  	0(x1) and d2s1dx21 =  	
00
(x1) < 0, by assumption, there must exist a
unique maximum point of s1. And the maximum surplus from rm 1 is given
by s1 = 	
0 1
(1)  	(	0 1 (1)). Similarly, the maximum surplus organizer could








Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. If there exists interior pure strategy equilibrium, then the optimal
























(x1   p1   x2 + p2) + 1 Q(x1   p1   x2 + p2) = 0(B.4)
Combine (B.1) and (B.2)
(B.5) ) p1 =
Q(x1   p1   x2 + p2)
Q0(x1   p1   x2 + p2)
.
Combine (B.3) and (B.4)
(B.6) ) p2 =
1 Q(x1   p1   x2 + p2)
Q0(x1   p1   x2 + p2)
.
Furthermore, the second order conditions must be satised to guarantee the












(x1   p1   x2 + p2) + p1Q
00
(x1   p1   x2 + p2)(B.8)
@21
@x1@p1
jx1 ;p1 = Q
0
(x1   p1   x2 + p2)  p1Q
00
(x1   p1   x2 + p2).(B.9)
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00   (Q0)2 > 0
p1Q
00





























































(x1   p1   x2 + p2)  p2Q
00





(x1   p1   x2 + p2) + p2Q
00
(x1   p1   x2 + p2).(B.16)
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00   (Q0)2 > 0
 p2Q
00





























=  c	00 (x2), then (B.19) can be written as
(B.20) Q
00










If there exists an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the F:O:C and S:O:C





























must hold simultaneously. When Q(:) is highly dense, for instance, for all the





































































































Therefore, no interior pure strategy equilibrium could survive if the noise dis-
tribution is highly dense. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.2






pi   x2i , if si   sj > a
pif (xi pi) (xj pj)+a2a g   x2i , if jsi   sjj  a
 x2i , if si   sj <  a
(B.24)
st: xi > 0 and pi > 0.
Existing interior pure strategy equilibrium requires the satisfaction of rst
order condition when jsi   sjj  a,
)

a  2  pi + pj + xi   xj = 0
pi
2a
  2xi = 0
.















































The su¢ cient conditions of existing optimal solutions require the Hessian ma-
trix is negative denite at the point (xi ; p


























then we can get
) a > 1
8
.





















Therefore when a > 1
8
, there exists a unique interior pure strategy equilibrium
with solutions as given by the proposition. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.3





p1   x21 , if s1   s2 > a
p1f (x1 p1) (x2 p2)+a2a g   x21, if js1   s2j  a
 x21 , if s1   s2 <  a
st: x1 > 0 and p1 > 0.
If the interior pure strategy equilibrium exists, in the case of js1   s2j  a, the
rst order conditions must be satised, which means that
(B.27)

a  2p1 + x1 + p2   x2 = 0
p1
2a
  2x1 = 0
.

















Now it is the time to verify the existence conditions of optimal solutions. And































The su¢ cient conditions of existing optimal solutions require the Hessian



































p2   cx22, if s2   s1 > a
p2f (x2 p2) (x1 p1)+a2a g   cx22, if js2   s1j  a
 cx22 if s2   s1 <  a
(B.29)
st: x2 > 0 and p2 > 0.
The necessary conditions require the rst order condition is satised in the








  2cx2 = 0
.
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Since the Hessian matrix is negative denite at the point (x2; p

2) if second






























The simple algebra yields the interior pure strategy equilibrium given in the
proposition by solving two best response functions (B.28) and (B.31) together.
Meanwhile, the equilibrium requires x1  0; x2  0; p1  0; p2  0; s1 
 a; s2   a; js1   s2j  a; a > 18 , which means
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)8><>: 6ac  1a > 1
8
or
8><>: 6a  1a > 1
8
:
These requirements can be met if and only either C1 or C2 holds. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof. s1   s2 =   (4a 1)(6ac 1)2[12ac (1+c)] + (6a 1)(4ac 1)2[12ac (1+c)] = 2ac 2a2[12ac (1+c)] . In Case 1, the
denominator is negative, because 12ac  2 < 1 + c. It is positive in Case 2.
This leads to the result. The claims for prices and qualities can be veried
similarly. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. (i) In the interior equilibrium, rmsquality choices are given by x1 =
  1 6ac
2( 1 c+12ac) , and x










[12ac (1+c)]2 > 0 in both cases.

















Consider the expression (1 + c)   12ac + 12a(6a   1)c2, which has the same




. Reorganize it as
72c2a2   12c(1 + c)a+ (1 + c).
















c2   1 > 1
6




c2   1 > 2c , pc2   1 > (c   1) , pc+ 1 > pc  1, which is





c2   1 < 1
6





Then this veries the property of p1. For p

2, we verify that the numerator
(1  12a)(1+ c)+72a2c must be positive for some large noise level. Rearrange
it as
72ca2   12(1 + c)a+ (1 + c).
It is always positive when a > 1+c
12c





, therefore , it is positive for all a  1
6
. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5







2(1 + c  30ac+ (1  12a+ 216a2)c2 + (1  30a+ 216a2   864a3)c3)





12( 1 + c)2c[ 1 + ( 1 + 48a)c]




for Case 1 and Case 2.




> 0, as m(1
8
; 1) =  1 < 0 and m(1
8
; 1:3) =
2:3586 > 0, there exists a unique point c s:t m(1
8
; c) = 0 when m(1
8
; c) is a
continuous function. Meanwhile, @m(a;c)
da
> 0 implies that when c  c, dp
da
 0.
However, when 1 < c < c, m(1
8
; c) < 0 and m( 1
6c
; c) = 4 2c
c 1 > 0, therefore,
137
there exists an point a(c) such thatm(a(c); c) = 0. And if a > a(c); dp
da
> 0.




1 < c < c and 1
8
< a < a; it increases with a, i.e., @p
@a
 0, whenever a  a
or c  c.
(ii) In Case 2, the function m(a; c) does not have a maximum value as
@m(a;c)
da
> 0. However, the supreme does exist when a approaches to innity:





2 + 2c(1 + c+ c2   864a3c2 + 216a2c(1 + c)  6a(5 + c(2 + 5c)))





Apparently, m(a; c) = @p
@a
< supm(a; c) =  1 < 0, which implies @p
@a
< 0
when a > 1
6
. 
Proof of Corollary 3.3













[12ac (1+c)]2 . Also,  2+ c+24ac  3(1 




and its derivative is  3c[96ac 8(1+ c)].





c 1 < 0 implies that
@s1
@a
















[12ac (1+c)]2 . The numerator can be
organized as
 144c2a2 + 24c(1 + c)a  (2c2   c+ 3).










(c  1)(2  c)). To
complete the proof, we proceed in two steps. First, when c > 2, the qua-
dratic function has no root, which means  144c2a2 + 24c(1 + c)a   (2c2  










(c  1)(2  c) must be strictly smaller than 1
6
if c > 3
2
, because it
is equivalent to (1 + c) +
p
(c  1)(2  c) < 2c,p(c  1)(2  c) < c  1,
p
2  c < pc  1. Therefore, when 1 < c  3
2




 0, which indicates that rm 2s bidding score s2 varies nonmonoton-
ically with the magnitude of the noise. 




=   36a( 1 + c)
2c
[(12a  1)c  1]3 < 0,
we can get that in Case 1, (12a  1)c  1 < 0 and dqwin
da
> 0. Also, it is known




Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. In the equilibrium, the derivative of buyers surplus with e¢ ciency
di¤erential is given by
@p
@c
=  (6a  1)[(18a  1)(4a  1)c  (2a  1)]
2[12ac  (1 + c)]3 .









 0, otherwise, @p
@c
> 0. In Case 2; 6a   1  0,
12ac   (1 + c) > 0 and 2a 1
(18a 1)(4a 1) > 1 (a <
1
4




 0, otherwise, @p
@c
 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.8









2[12ac  (1 + c)]2 ,
@x2
@c
=  (6a  1)(12a  1)





[12ac  (1 + c)]2 ,
@p2
@c
=   2a(6a  1)
[12ac  (1 + c)]2 ,
@s1
@c
=   (6a  1)(4a  1)
2[12ac  (1 + c)]2 ,
@s2
@c
=   (6a  1)(8a  1)
2[12ac  (1 + c)]2 .
(i) In Case 1, 6a 1 < 0, 12a 1 > 0, 4a 1 < 0 and 8a 1 > 0. Therefore,

























(ii) In Case 2, 6a   1  0, 12a   1 > 0, 4a   1  0 and 8a   1 > 0.
























Proof of Proposition 3.9




















3(6a  1) f(1 + c) + 2a[(36a  11)c  1]g






=  24( 1 + c)[1 + c+ 144a
2c  3a(1 + 11c)]
(1 + c  12ac)4 .
Meanwhile, denote
k(a) = 1 + c+ 144a2c  3a(1 + 11c)



























, which means k(a) < 0 and dg(a;c)
da
> 0. Therefore,
when a = 1
8
, g(a; c) will get its minimum value min
a
































(ii) Now consider Case 2. Whenever a > a, k(a) > 0 , hence, dg(a;c)
da
< 0 for
all a > a. Accordingly, there will be no minimum value for g(a; c). However,
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3( 1 + 6a)(1 + c+ 2a( 1 + ( 11 + 36a)c))
























48(c 1)c3 . For c > 1, c
2   c >
c2  2c+ 1) pc2   c > c  1, which leads to dm(c)
dc
< 0. Similarly, there is no
minimum value for m(c). However, the inmum of m(c) exists, which is also
the inmum of g(a; c),





















Since g(a; c) = @
@c
> inf(g(a; c)) = 0, which means @
@c
> 0 in this case. 
Proof of Proposition 3.10
Proof. Because @
@c




p   b = lim
c!1
f1 + c  288a
3c2 + 84a2c(1 + c)  4a(1 + 6c+ c2)


















Therefore, such limitation can be rewritten as follows:
lim
c!1
p   b = lim
c!1
 288a3 + 84a2   4a











 288a3 + 84a2   4a














 288a3 + 84a2   4a











By the LHospital rule, we can get
lim
c!1
p   b = lim
c!1
 288a3 + 84a2   4a








 288a3 + 84a2   4a










 288a3 + 84a2   4a










 288a3 + 84a2   4a
2( 1 + 12a)2 .


















p   b < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.11 and 3.12
Before we formally prove these results, one more lemma is introduced.
Lemma B.1. There exists no pure-strategy equilibrium in which js1   s2j
exceeds a.
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Proof. We verify this claim by contradiction. Suppose js1   s2j > a. Let
s1   s2 = a+  with  > 0. In this case, rm 1 wins with probability one. Its
prot can then be written as
1 = (x

1   s1) 	(x1) = x1   (a+ + s2) 	(x1).




2 by raising its price to p

1+. In this case, rm 1





1 s01) 	(x1) = x1 (a+s2) 	(x1). The assumed equilibrium
thus breaks down. A similar argument applies to the case of s2   s1 > a. 
Proof of Proposition 3.11.
Proof. Suppose there exists pure strategies s1, s





loss of generality, assuming that s1   s2 = na, where n 2 R and  1  n  1,
then p1 = x1   na  s2 , and the prot rm 1 can get is
1 = (x1   na  s2)n+ 1
2
  x21.
Therefore, rm 1 bids x1 =
n+1
4





n(1  8a) + 1
8
  s2),
which has the minimum value with respect to n. When  1 < n < 1, given s2,
rm 1 always has incentive to deviate to n = 1 if 1
4
  a   s2 > 0, otherwise,
rm 1 will bid to a point where n =  1. Hence, in equilibrium, js1   s2j = a.
First, suppose s1   s2 = a.
144








  a) optimally. Given s1 = a,
rm 2 will deviate to s
0
2 = 2a to get positive prot
1
4c
 2a. Accordingly, s2 = 0
can never be an equilibrium.
b) If 1
4
  a > s2 > 0, rm 2 still wants to deviate to s02 = 0 to minimize the
loss, which is contrary with part a). Therefore, 1
4
  a > s2 > 0 can not be an
equilibrium.
c) If a < s2 < 0 , given s1 = s2+a , rm 2 will switch to s02 = s1+a+" > 0
to get positive payo¤, which means  a < s2 < 0 is also not an equilibrium.
By the same token, we can prove the case s1   s2 =  a. Therefore, the pure
equilibrium strategies can not exist when 0 < a < 1
8c
. 
Proof of Proposition 3.12.
Proof. We now verify s1 = a, s

2 = 0 is an equilibrium when
1
8c
 a  1
8
. If














st: x1 > 0 ; a  s1  a.
From rst order condition, rm 1 will bid x1 =
s1+a
4a
, and the corresponding
prot 1 = ( 116a2   12a)s21 + ( 18a   12)s1 + 116 . As 18c  a  18 , 116a2   12a  0 and
 a  s1  a, rm 1 will choose to bid s1 = a. Given s1 = a, rm 2 maximizes
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st: x2 > 0 ; a  s2  a.
Similarly, rm 2 will bid x2 =
s2
4ac












 0 and  a  s2  a, rm 2 will choose to
bid s2 = 0. Accordingly, s

1 = a; s

2 = 0 is an equilibrium when
1
8c




B2: Comparative Static Summary
Table 3.1: Noise E¤ect





when 1 < c < c
and 1
8




when when c  c



































































































when 1 < c < 65








when c  65











> 0 , when 1 < c < 3
2
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Table 3.2: E¢ ciency Di¤erential E¤ect



































when c  14
13


























































C: Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. When there are N prizes, suppose a monotone bidding strategy exists.

















(vi   vN)FN i(e 1(e))[1  F (e 1(e))]i 1.
Adopting the methodology of Moldovanu and Sela (2006) leads to the following














































































Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. The intermediary will choose pexf to maximize the expected payo¤ as
follows,
pexf = Maxpexf
pexf (1  FN(0(pexf )))
= pexf (1  (0)N)
= pexf (1 
s0N
(N   1)(I   pexf )
).
The necessary condition implies that the rst-order condition should be satis-
ed, which means
1  s0NI




pexf = I  
p
Ns0I(N   1)
N   1 .

Proof of Lemma 4.3

















The intermediary will choose w and s
0







e()FN 1()NdF () + ws
0
[1  (0)N ].










































Also, the commission payment cannot exceed the entrepreneurs budget. Solv-
ing (C.1) and (4.4) together, we get
w =













Proof of Lemma 4.4







Meanwhile, there exists a critical type of contestant r, such that if  < r,
e() = 0; otherwise, e()  0. The optimal strategy for player should satisfy
the rst-order condition, which means
e
0
() = v(N   1)FN 2().
Combining with the boundary condition, we get











Proof of Lemma 4.5
Proof. The platform will charge penf to maximize expected prot, as follows:
penf = Maxpenf







The satisfaction of the rst-order condition indicates that









)N = q; then the expression for the prize can be simpli-
ed as
v =

















e()FN 1()NdF () + ws
0
[1  (0)N ].









































Proof of Lemma 4.7
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose r < s0, then the prize left
for contestants is v1 =
p
rI. However, if entrepreneur sets r = s0, then
v2 =
p












rIN ]NN 1d   I[1  FN(r)].












N ]NN 1d   I[1  FN(0)].
Clearly,
f1 < f2 ,
as [1  FN(r)] > [1  FN(0)].
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Therefore, for each r < s0, the entrepreneurs prot will be dominated by
choosing s0. In other words, r  s0: 
Proof of Lemma 4.9






















Also, r > s0 , so the rst-order condition yields







Proof of Lemma 4.10



























































































0  r. 
Proof of Lemma 4.11
Proof. Since
s0 = (1  )V A(0) + V B(0),
when B(0)  A(0), the entrepreneur will never use the second prize, so if
 > 0, the contestantse¤ort level will uniformly decrease with the second
prize. Now let us consider the situation when B(0) > A(0), which can be
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written as follows:
B(0)  A(0) = (N   1)
Z 0

tFN 3(t)[N   2 NF (t)]dF (t)
 e Z 0

FN 3(t)[N   2 NF (t)]dF (t)
= eFN 3(0)[N   1 NF (0)],
where F (e) = N 2
N
. Clearly, when B(0) > A(0), F (0)  N 1N , and vice





(1  )(N   1)0[F (0)]N 2f(0) + (N   1)0[F (0)]N 3[(1 N)F (0) +N   2]f(0) .












fB()  A()gNFN 1()dF ()  s0N [F (0)]N 1f(0)
A(0) B(0)
(1  )(N   1)0[F (0)]N 2f(0) + (N   1)0[F (0)]N 3[(1 N)F (0) +N   2]f(0) ].
Suppose F (e) = N 2
N




























(N   1)t[F (t)]N 3[(N   2) NF (t)]dF (t)dF ()





(N   1)[F (t)]N 3[(N   2) NF (t)]dF (t)dF ()
=  eN F 2(0)  2F 2N+1(0)N + F 2N(0)(2N   1)
2F 2(0)(2N   1)
  0NF
2(0)  2F 2N+1(0)N + F 2N(0)(2N   1)
2F 2(0)(2N   1) .
and
B(0)  A(0)  0
Z 0

(N   1)t[F (t)]N 3[(N   2) NF (t)]dF (t)
= 0[F (0)]
N 2(N   1 NF (0)).




  eN F 2(0)  2F 2N+1(0)N + F 2N(0)(2N   1)
2F 2(0)(2N   1) ,
and
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B(0)  A(0)  e Z 0

(N   1)t[F (t)]N 3[(N   2) NF (t)]dF (t)
= e[F (0)]N 2(N   1 NF (0)).




2(0)  2F 2N+1(0)N + F 2N(0)(2N   1)
2F 2(0)(2N   1)
+[F (0)]
2N 3(N 1 NF (0)) (1  )F
2(0) + (1  F (0))F (0)(N   1)
(1  )(N   1)F (0) + (N   1)[N   2  (N   1)F (0)]g.
Meanwhile, we dene
g(F (0); ) =
(1  )F 2(0) + (1  F (0))F (0)(N   1)
(1  )(N   1)F (0) + (N   1)[N   2  (N   1)F (0)] ,
as dg(F (0);)
d
















2(0)  2F 2N+1(0)N + F 2N(0)(2N   1)
2F 2(0)(2N   1)
+[F (0)]
2N 2(N   1 NF (0)) 2
N   2g
 2(2N   1)0Nf 1 + 2F 2N 1(0)N   F 2N 2(0)(2N   1) +
[F (0)]
2N 2(N   1 NF (0)) 2
N   22(2N   1)g
 2(2N   1)0Nf 1 + 2F 2N 1(0)N   F 2N 2(0)(2N   1)
+[F (0)]
2N 2(N   1 NF (0))  20g.
Dene
k(F (0); N) =  1+2F 2N 1(0)N F 2N 2(0)(2N 1)+[F (0)]2N 2(N 1 NF (0))20,
when F (0) = 19 37N+18N
2
9N(2N 1) , k gets the maximum value k




Therefore, the maximum value of k(N) is obtained when k = 3. As k(3) < 0,
dp
d
 0, the same proof applies as for the case 2.
When N = 2, B(0) < A(0) and two prizes will never be optimal. 
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